Struggle for Power in Spain
Convention of the A. F. of L.
Question of Communist Cadres



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THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FASCISM, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER, FOR THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' REPUBLIC IN SPAIN

THE revolution in Spain has been developing for more than three and a half years. During these years general strikes have taken place time and time again, in both the towns and villages. During these years "armed insurrections" have broken out in Spain on more than one occasion, sometimes semi-spontaneously, sometimes "organized" by the anarchists.

But the events that took place in Spain in the autumn of 1934 represent something *new* in the development of the Spanish revolution. In these heroic days the Spanish revolution grew higher by a head, matured and gained a *new starting point for its further development on the path towards the establishment of Soviet Power in Spain.*

For the first time the question of *power* was decided in open battle; for the first time the mass struggle, the general strike against the capitalist offensive, against fascism and reaction, grew into a *mass armed revolt (in Asturias, Biscay, etc.), for the workers' and peasants' republic, for the power of the workers' and peasants' alliances, for the power of the Soviets and for a workers' and peasants' government.*

THE ALIGNMENT OF CLASS FORCES AT THE MOMENT OF THE GENERAL STRIKE AND THE ARMED UPRISING

The development of the revolution led to a situation where the very course of events raised the alternatives: either the power of the working class and peasants, or else the naked dictatorship of Spanish fascism. This is clearly shown by the entire *alignment of class forces* in Spain on the eve of the events, and the *change* in the tactics of the ruling bourgeois-landlord bloc.

The November elections to the Cortes in 1933 showed that the influence of the Right monarchist-clerical parties and especially of the fascist parties had grown strong in Spain. The fascists and the Right parties in general received about two-thirds of the votes in the Cortes, to a great extent at the expense of the religious-minded women* who were participating in the elections for the first time, and at the expense of a section of the peasants, disillusioned in the republic which had not fulfilled a single one of the promises made to the peasants. But, as further events showed, the results of these elections were by no means a sign of the ebbing of the revolutionary wave in Spain. On the contrary, the revolutionary movement of the working class and the movement of the nationally oppressed peoples of Catalonia and Biscay *assumed tremendous proportions and advanced* ahead during the last year.

A characteristic feature for Spain during the last year was the *prevalance of general political strikes* and sympathetic strikes. It is sufficient merely to call to mind that in Asturias alone there were five general political strikes from the beginning of the year until September, 1934, in Biscay—four political strikes, while from April to September, 1934, there were four general-political strikes in Madrid alone.

In addition to this, mention should be made of a number of economic strikes which frequently grow into political strikes. The frequent *repetition* of general-political strikes is a clear indication of the militant nature of the strike movement and of the tremendous stubbornness of the strikers. This is also shown by the *long duration* of the strikes. For example, the general strike in Saragossa at the beginning of this year lasted 40 days, the Madrid metal workers' strike lasted three months, etc.

But is not sufficient simply to note the enormous growth of political strikes. It is extremely important to point out that among them an important place was occupied this year by strikes directed right against the offensive of fascism (not only Spanish) and against the policy of fascization conducted by the government. It is sufficient to point to the February strike of solidarity with the Austrian proletariat who were carrying on an armed struggle against fascism. This strike affected 125,000 persons, mostly in Asturias and in Zamora. It should be borne in mind that this solidarity strike was declared and conducted by the Communist Party of Spain alone and in spite of the Socialists and anarchists.

We should further note the strike of April 21, 1934, in protest against the fascist march on Ecurial near Madrid. About 100,000 young bloods were expected at this first fascist meet, but the plot proved to be a fiasco, owing to the general strike in Madrid organized by the Communist Party. The fascists had the greatest difficulty in gathering 4,000 to 5,000 people at the rally. The second rally was called for September 8, 1934, in Covagonda in Asturias. Thanks to the general strike in Asturias and on the

* 55 per cent of the electors were women.

railways, the fascists were able to gather a mere 500 persons, who came along in their own automobiles in place of the 10,000 who had been expected. A clear political and impressive character was also possessed by the general strike in Madrid on September 8, 1934, in which about 200,000 participated, against the rally of the Catalonian landlords.

Since the end of the summer of 1934, the situation in Spain began particularly to intensify. After a short breathing space (after the June agricultural workers' strike) *the curve of the revolutionary movement turned sharply upwards* from August onwards. The movement of the industrial proletariat grew rapidly, the national revolutionary movement and the movement of the urban petty-bourgeoisie developed, and the anti-fascist front was strengthened.

In the towns on the eve of the general strike, despite the increased activity of the fascists, *some of the petty bourgeoisie began to leave the Right parties* and to pass partly into the camp of the revolution, partly into the "Left" bourgeois parties (the unification of the Left petty-bourgeois groups into a single party led by Asana, the split of the chief government party, the Radical Party, in the middle of 1934, and the formation of a Republican Party under the leadership of Martines Barrio, the growth of the "Catalonian Left" Party, etc.).

A still more important indication of the decline in the influence of the fascist Right-wing parties in the town, an indication of the *swing to the Left* which had taken place among the petty bourgeoisie, was the extensive participation of the urban petty bourgeoisie in the anti-fascist front (in demonstrations, meetings and campaigns for the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann, etc.).

After August, the working class movement developed mainly in the form of big general strikes, solidarity strikes (Asturias, Madrid, Cadiz, Leon, Jeres, de la Frontera, etc.) and in the form of big demonstrations, meetings, gatherings, etc. All this activity began to be conducted more and more on the basis of the *united front* of the Communist Party and the Y.C.L. with the Socialist Party and the Young Socialists, while the anarchist leaders fought sharply against the united front.

Thanks to the policy of the Socialists, anarchists and bourgeois nationalists, the scope of the movement among the peasants and the national emancipation movement lagged far behind that of the movement of the proletariat.

After the autumn of 1932, the villages began to undergo a rapid process of revolutionization and there began the seizure of the landlords' estates. Beginning with Autumn 1933, the actions of the peasants in the struggle for land grew spontaneously into a struggle against the organs of the government and in a number of cases turned into armed resistance to the gendarmes and the troops. In the villages the ferment was mainly spread by the farm laborers. In June 1934, a tremendous general strike of agricultural workers took place in which 500,000 people took part. The movement, however, was spontaneous in character. The anarchists who were very influential in the Spanish villages (especially in the South, in the main peasant districts) played the role of strike-breakers and in every way hindered the development of the agrarian revolution. The Socialist Party, which had formed part of the government coalition with the bourgeoisie and the land owners' parties and operated the policy of the Spanish bourgeoisie, thereby clearing the way for fascism, not only did nothing at all for the peasants, but helped to crush the peasant movement. In June 1934 the Socialists together with the anarchists refused to support the proletariat (through solidarity strikes) by organizing a general strike of agricultural workers, as the Communists demanded. As a result, a certain section of the villages began to turn their back on the republic.

As for the national emancipation movement in Catalonia, Biscay and Galicia, which was closely interwoven with the agrarian movement, the basic weakness here was also the fact that *the proletariat was not at the head of this movement.* The leadership of the national movement was in the hands of the parties of the national small and middle bourgeoisie, and in Biscay, to some degree, in the hands of the party of the big bourgeoisie. The Socialists ignored the national-liberation movement, while the anarchists took up a sharply antagonistic position on the question of the independence of Catalonia. It is true that, in spite of the Socialists and the anarchists, the workers supported the national-liberation movement. At the initiative of the Communist Party, the workers of Madrid prevented the meet of Catalonian landlords in Madrid by their September general strike. The conduct of the Socialists and anarchists on the national question, however, had its effect. Since the national-liberation movement was not led by the proletariat, it did not respond to the October call for a general strike in the degree one might have expected, while the bourgeois-nationalist Catalonian government at once made a cowardly capitulation to the counter-revolutionary generals.

* * *

As the result of the growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, a process of differentiation took place in the camp of the bourgeoisie. The Radical Party, the chief party of the industrial bourgeoisie, came nearer and nearer to the chief fascist "national action" party. The "Left" bourgeois parties, although in an extremely timid manner, nevertheless took up a more definite position under the pressure of the masses against the bloc of the

Radical Party with the party of "national action".

The fascists on their part carried on increased activity and were plainly in a hurry.

In the autumn of 1933, especially after the November election to the Cortes a *change in tactics* could plainly be noticed in the leading fascist party of the ruling bourgeois-landlord bloc, the "party of national action" led by Gil Robles.*

Up till then the party of "national action" had systematically refused to participate in the government.

The party of "national action" (otherwise the fascist-clerical party) considered that it should set up a *mass basis* among the broad strata of the population before seizing power. The party of Gil Robles, with a view to widening its basis, now made use of the discontent of the peasants (and to some extent of the farm laborers) who suffered from shortage of land and who had not received anything from the Republican Socialist government.

The closer the moment came for the unleashing of the events which had matured, the more the fascist front became consolidated. The basic fascist party —the party of "national action", at the end of the summer of 1934 openly raised the question of *entering the government* and of the necessity for a keener struggle against the revolution. From the summer of 1934 onwards the bourgeoisie adopted a course aiming at unloosing civil war amongst the proletariat.

The Lerroux and Samper government increased the repression against the revolutionary movement and the workers' organizations day after day.

The leaders of the Spanish counter-revolution, however, saw that Samper was unable to cope with the ever growing wave of revolution. Then Gil Robles stated that his party wanted to take power into its hands immediately "so as to *put an end to the revolution forever*". It was precisely with this aim that the Lerroux government, into which three ministers from the fascist party of "national action" entered, was formed on October 4, 1934.

Thus, in face of the *revolutionary uprising, which was already mature,* fascism raised point blank the question of power. The proletariat were *immediately* forced to fight or else to permit the establishment of an open fascist dictatorship without a battle. The working class of Spain *accepted* the challenge, though the choice of the moment was *forced on them* by Spanish counter-revolution.

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* Along with this party, there are two other fascist parties in Spain—the "Spanish Phalanx" led by the son of Primo de Rivera and using social-demagogy on a particularly wide scale, and the monarchist party "Renovacion Espanole" led by Gopcochea.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED FRONT

At the moment when the recent events took place, the majority of the working class followed the *Socialists and anarchists,* and moreover, the *Socialists were the basic force in the working class,* with 50,000 party members, 25,000 Young Socialists and 700,000 to 900,000 members of the reformist trade unions.

The influence of the Socialists grew rapidly, mainly at the expense of the anarchists (who rapidly lost their influence, especially during the past year) and at the expense of the petty-bourgeois masses who were leaving the Right parties or were being drawn for the first time into the political struggle.

After the Socialist Party left the government in 1933, the "Left" wing, led by Largo Caballero, obtained decisive weight in the Party. Taking into account the sentiments of the Leftward swinging masses, the Socialists led by Largo Caballero advanced the slogan of the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the violent overthrow of the government".

At the same time, however, the *Rights* (led by Besteiro, De los Rios, etc.) *remained in the leadership of the Socialist Party.*

The Spanish Young Socialists have recently begun to occupy an ever more Left position.

The influence of the Communist Party, which, on the eve of the general strike had about 20,000 members, *increased* mainly at the expense of the Socialist Party and of new strata previously unorganized. The growth of the Communist Party, not only in numbers, but above all in its influence, became particularly plain at the end of the summer of this year. The *speed,* however, at which *the influence of the Communist Party grew,* was *absolutely insufficient.* Before the development of the events that followed, a *mass* swing-over from the Socialist Party and the Young Socialists to the Communist Party was only just beginning. This process applied mostly to the Young Socialists. After the end of August 1934, the entrance of *groups of workers* into the Communist Party (including both Socialists and members of reformist trade unions) took place ever more frequently.

In the winter of 1933-34 the Socialist Party organized the Workers' Alliance ("Alliance Obrero"). This included the Socialist Party, the Young Socialists, the reformist unions, the "Trentists" (who had left the anarcho-syndicalist organizations), the Trotzkyists, some autonomous trade unions and individual anarchist organizations.

At first the Workers' Alliance met with strong criticism from the Communist Party. Formed according to the ideas of the Socialist Party, it was undoubtedly calculated on destroying the united front with the Communists. For this purpose the Socialists drew into the Alliance the renegade Maurin group

and the counter-revolutionary Trotzkyists (who have no mass influence).

The "Alliance Obrero" was a combination of leaders. But the urge towards the united front found expression in the growth of the influence of the Alliance. Then the Communist Party of Spain made the correct decision—to enter the Alliance, in order to *develop its program and tactics there* so as to convert the Workers' Alliance into a really *wide organ of the united front.* The Communist Party set iself the task of reconstructing the Alliance from below on the basis of elected delegates from mills and factories, from mass organizations and above all from the trade unions. At the same time, the problem was raised from the very beginning of converting the "Workers' Alliance" into a "Workers' and Peasants' Alliance", by drawing in the representatives of the peasants, of the peasant committees. The resolution of the C.C. of the C.P. of Spain published in *Mondo Obrero* on November 17, stated: "Workers' alliances, as shown already by their name, *arise as organs of one of the fundamental driving forces of the revolution, namely of the proletariat* which is the leading force. *But they do not contain representatives of the second fundamental driving force,* namely, *the peasant, without whom the alliance cannot ensure the victory of the revolution.*" In short, the Communist Party of Spain took the line of *converting the alliance in the process of the struggle into soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.* The experience of Asturias confirmed the correctness of this setting of the question.

While agreeing to support the slogan of "all power to the alliances", the Communist Party immediately made it a condition that the following minimum program be carried through:

1. The confiscation of the land (belonging to the landowners and the church) and its free distribution among the peasants.
2. The disarming of all the forces of the counter-revolution and the arming of the workers and peasants.
3. Control over industry and the banks.
4. The 40-hour week while maintaining the wages paid for 48 hours.
5. The introduction of social insurance and unemployment insurance.
6. A fight against the large-scale speculators and usurers, the confiscation of their property for the benefit of the unemployed.
7. The annulment of all debts owed by the peasants and small shopkeepers to the banks.
8. The liberation of the oppressed nationalities of Catalonia, Biscay and Galicia and the recognition of the independence of Morocco.

It is very noticeable that at the beginning the Socialist Party increasingly advanced the slogan of "all power to the Workers' Alliance" as against our slogan of "all power to the Soviets", but when the Communist Party of Spain supported this slogan in the middle of September, the Socialist Party immediately abandoned it and returned to its old slogan of "all power to the Socialist Party".

Thus the *Communist Party of Spain succeeded in taking into its hands the initiative in the struggle for the "Workers' and Peasants' Alliances"*, a fact which greatly strengthened the position of the Spanish proletariat in the October battles and helped the growth of the authority of the Communist Party among the masses.

The basic force which disrupted the united front in Spain, right up to the general strike and the rebellion and during the rebellion, was the anarchist National Confederation of Labor led by the anarchists. The anarchists *refused to join the Workers' Alliance.* They tried to break the political strikes called and often acted as strike-breakers. They carried on a disgusting campaign against the Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. Some of the anarchist leaders were in direct contact with Lerroux all the time. In some places, however, for example in Asturias where the influence of the Communists was particularly strong and where the pressure of the mass movement was enormous, some of the anarchist organizations joined the "Workers' Alliance". In a number of places the anarchist workers took part in demonstrations, strikes and uprisings, despite the prohibition of the anarchist leaders.

HOW THE COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS ESTIMATED THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND PREPARED FOR THE ARMED UPRISING

How were the oncoming battles prepared for?

Did the Communist Party foresee how close was the beginning of decisive battles against fascism, battles for power?

It must be noted that since the beginning of 1933, the Communist Party correctly estimated the situation and set itself as its *central task the political and organizational preparation both of the proletariat and its vanguard, as well as of the broad masses of the peasantry, for the struggle for power.* This task further was set not as a prospect for the distant future but *as a task of the immediate present.* In particular, bearing in mind the close prospect of a possible uprising, the Communist Party joined the "Alliance Obrero".

Beginning with the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C. P. of Spain (September 11 and 12) the Communist Party warned the masses that the time to settle the issue was coming on.

From the end of September the Communist Party called on the masses to prepare for decisive action.

The Communist Party called for a struggle against

the threat of a fascist coup d'etat, and for a workers' and peasants' government, for a workers' and peasants' republic.

On the 2nd of October, 1934, the *Mundo Obrero* wrote the following:

> "The toilers are not prepared to tolerate this situation of hunger and poverty any longer. They are drawing the following conclusions from the crisis being undergone: 'The republic promised us the land, but we have received bullets; we were promised work, but we have received hunger and poverty; we were promised freedom, but we have been given prisons and penal servitude; our press has been closed down, and our legal activities have been smothered; we were promised that an end would be put to the odious privileges of the church, the anarchist officers and the fascists, but today we see them at their posts once again. *The toilers have nothing in common with such a republic.* The only way out of the present situation is the way which the Communist Party points to the toilers of town and country, namely, the seizure of power, and the establishment *of a workers' and peasants' government*'." (Re-translated—Ed.)

At its September Plenum the Central Committee of the Party correctly directed attention to the necessity for the *propaganda of the program of a workers' and peasants' government,* as one of the conditions for the preparations for the overthrow of the bourgeois landowning "regime".

Two days before the beginning of the events, the Communist Party published in the *Mundo Obrero a program of the struggle for power, the program of the future Workers' and Peasants' Government,* which developed the platform popularized by the C.P. of Spain during the election campaign of October-November, 1933.

Special attention needs to be given to the fact that this historical manifesto formulated in detail the revolutionary measures along with the broad proletarian demands which a workers' and peasants' government would carry out in connection with the peasantry and the toiling nationalities (Catalonia, Biscay, Galicia and Morocco).

In estimating this document as a whole, we must note that in it we see a clearly formulated program of *the revolutionary dictatorship of the working class and peasantry in the shape of workers' and peasants' alliances (Soviets)*, a program which the workers' and peasants' government would immediately proceed to operate. This is still not the program of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But struggle to operate it will inevitably lead to the *speedy passage to the dictatorship of the proletariat.* In the manifesto we read of the confiscation and nationalization of enterprises belonging to *large scale trustified* industry, about the control of the Soviets over production and consumption, and of the organization "of a workers' and peasants' Red Army, which will defend the interests of the toiling masses and the revolution".

The manifesto clearly stipulates *the character* of the Workers' and Peasants' *Alliances (Soviets), as revolutionary organs of power.*

> "The delegates of the Alliances", the document reads, "who will be freely elected by the toilers themselves, will finally smash the power of the exploiting classes, the capitalists and landowners; they will completely do away with the unpopular and bureaucratic apparatus of force belonging to the state and municipalities, and will replace them by popular bodies in which the broadest masses of workers and peasants will participate in the management of the state. The body (Soviets) thus set up will ensure them bread, work and freedom and will represent them and defend their interests and their everyday needs." (Re-translated —Ed.)

Finally, we must take note of the following point as one of the most important political tasks in the program:

> *"Proletarian solidarity with the oppressed throughout the world and a fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union, which is victoriously constructing Socialism and is a mighty bulwark of the world proletariat and the oppressed peoples against international fascism and the reactionary forces of capitalism."* (Re-translated—Ed.)

The document concludes with the call for:

> *"The struggle against imperialist war and for the defense of the Soviet Union."* (Re-translated —Ed.)

While the Communist Party, in moving forward to the struggle for power, developed a program of Soviet revolution, the anarchists openly declared that they had nothing in common with this movement of the "politicians" and with the general strike which was being prepared. The leaders of the anarchists acted as the open and basest betrayers of the working class and the revolution. At the price of this treachery they sanctified their open alliance with all the dark forces of the Spanish counter-revolution.

The position of the Spanish Socialists was a different one. We have in view the majority of the Socialist Party which was headed by the Left leadership, and which we separate from the Rights headed by Bester, who openly declared against developing the struggle and did everything possible to be of service to Spanish reaction and fascism.

The fact that the time for a fascist coup d'etat had ripened when the Spanish Socialists were already faced with the terrible example of the Hitler dictatorship, which had dealt its blows at the Socialists as well, and the still more important fact that the

revolution has been developing in Spain for several years, explains why the official majority of the Socialist Party of Spain, which had previously participated in the coalition government, and cleared the way for fascism now, and had itself assisted in the fascization of the State, now occupied another position in the struggle against fascism than did German and Austrian Social-Democracy. But while they took up a position different from that of the German and Austrian Social-Democrats, and while their position was completely counter to that of the Spanish anarchists, the position taken up by the Socialists was at the same time *fundamentally* distinct from that taken up by the Communists. The aims which the Socialist Party, headed by Largo Caballero, set itself, were conditioned by the desire to scare the bourgeoisie at the prospect of an armed struggle, and were, in any case, *limited to the defense of the Republic.* The Socialist Party really did call on the working class, long before the events that followed, to display watchfulness and to prepare for struggle against the fascist onslaught, and really prepared this struggle from a technical point of view, but its banners bore the slogans of the defense of the Republic, and the slogan of power advanced by the Socialist Party meant nothing other than the struggle to democratize the existing republic.

There can be no doubt that a definite section in the Socialist Party counted on the bourgeoisie being scared by the mass movement, and bringing the Socialist Party to power, or on succeeding in forming a Socialist government in bloc with the Left Republicans.

The majority of the Socialist Party of Spain, headed by Largo Caballero, went to the defense of the republic. But the whole course of events placed the question on the order of the day of the conquest of *another* republic, of the struggle to establish the democratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry in the shape of the workers' and peasants' "Alliances", *in the shape of Soviets, of the struggle for a workers' and peasants' government.* But the Socialists neither wished to, nor in fact did they, place this on the order of the day. And it was no accident that the Socialist Party did not issue clear slogans. The slogan of "the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" which the Socialists repeatedly issued after they had left the coalition government, lived a peaceful existence side by side with their slogan of the defense of the existing republic as the central task facing them. It is no accident that the slogan "all power to the Alliances" ceased to be displayed, and that even the slogan of "all power to the Socialist Party" began, as a rule, to be missing. The Socialist Party feared the further advance of the fascists. But at the same time *it itself was afraid to go forward.* However, as further events showed, the struggle of the Spanish proletariat passed over the head of the Socialist Party right from the very beginning.

The Socialists *carried through certain preparations* for the struggle against the oncoming fascist coup d'etat, and for the defense of the republic, and fought to democratize the republic and *then took part in the general strike, and in some places in the armed uprising, as well. The* Socialist Party had large means at its disposal, and also counted on support from the officers in the army. The Socialist Party, as well as the Communist Party, had a working class militia, but the armed Socialist militia (with the exception of Asturias) were, as a rule, numerically superior to the militia led by the Communist Party.

But while the Socialists carried on certain military-technical preparations for an armed struggle, they completely failed to carry on any *political preparations* for it, and they disrupted it. *The Socialists and anarchists did everything possible in opposition to the establishment of Soviets. The "Alliances" only existed in a few districts. They did not embrace the main masses of the industrial proletariat.*

On the eve of the October battles, and while they were taking place, the Socialists did everything possible to disrupt the organization of workers' Alliances, or tried to remove the Communists from participation in them.

There was an almost complete absence of factory committees and peasant committees. Both the anarchists and the Socialists declared against these being established.

It goes without saying that the Socialists paid no attention to the peasantry and national-revolutionary movement, but, rather, offered decisive resistance to them being drawn on to the side of the revolution. All this proved that the Spanish Socialists headed by Largo Caballero did not for a single moment seriously set themselves the question of the struggle for power and of the preparation for this.

As distinct from the Socialists, the Communists prepared the armed uprising *politically.* But the Communist Party was far weaker than the Socialist Party, and the trade unions which supported it were six to seven times weaker in numbers than the reformist unions. The contacts of the Communist Party with the village were very weak. *The sentiments of the mass of advanced proletarians in favor* of the armed uprising, and the preparation of Robles for a fascist coup d'etat, *outdistanced the political preparation of the broad masses for the uprising by the Communists. Especially weak were the military-technical preparations for the armed uprising made by the Communist Party.* The Communists correctly estimated the situation, correctly set the tasks to be fulfilled, and indicated the program needed, and

issued the only correct slogan, but they were not in a position to retrieve the points they had missed. And the counter-revolution was clearly in a hurry.

THE PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BATTLES

On October 4, a Lerroux government was established in which the fascists took part for the first time. And on the night of the 4th and 5th, as far as we can judge from press reports, a general strike began, which soon embraced all the most important districts in Spain (Asturias, Biscay, Catalonia, Madrid, Leon, Galicia, Salamanca, San Sabastian, Alicant, Valencia, Validolid, Andalusia from the center of Seville, Cadiz, Aragon, Cordova, etc.) From the very beginning the strike took on a real *all-Spanish character*. A characteristic feature of this general strike was the fact that it was accompanied almost everywhere by *armed struggle*. And in the North (Asturias and Biscay) the general strike *developed into a mass armed uprising* in the most important centers of the heavy industry.

That it was not a question in these instances simply of an armed struggle accompanying the general strike, *but of an armed uprising,* is proved first and foremost by the very character of the struggle, the main point of which consisted in the struggle *for power, for Soviets.*

Alongside the two main centers of the armed uprising we must note a series of local outbreaks of armed uprisings, which, although they did not receive a development analogous to that in Asturias and Biscay, still led to the establishment of Soviets in some localities. Thus, for instance, in the Leon province, a number of towns were seized by the insurgents; in the town of Prado del Re (in the province of Cadiz) the workers seized power and set fire to the law courts and the municipal hall; the city of Granole (Catalonia) was taken by the workers; the city of Logranno was in the hands of armed strikers; the city of Renoson (in the Santadera district) fell completely into the hands of the Communists; in Villa Robledo the workers proceeded to establish Soviets; in the province of San Sebastian the workers seized power; an uprising was organized in Estramod with the aid of a section of the troops, etc. It is characteristic that in a number of places where there was a comparatively weaker development of the struggle, fierce armed struggles took place (Saragossa and Seville) none the less, and the workers disarmed the gendarmes, etc.

In Seville, where our Party organization has been very much weakened in the recent period, the events did not develop to the necessary extent, although strikes broke out and conflicts took place with the police, etc.

If first place in the heroic struggle of the Spanish proletariat in the October days belongs to Asturias and Biscay, then the next places should be allotted to Catalonia and Madrid.

In Catalonia the general strike began to extend from the morning of the 6th of October and was immediately accompanied by armed conflicts. The workers of Barcelona armed themselves and occupied several strategic points in the city. On the evening of the 6th of October, under the pressure of the masses, a free Catalonian republic was declared, but by reason of the indecisiveness and the waverings of the Escer Party and its leader, the head of the Catalonian republic, Companis, government troops numbering 10,000 men were enabled to attack the palace, and on the morning of the 7th of October the Catalonian government capitulated. The radio in Barcelona called the populace to the armed uprising until 6 o'clock in the morning of October 7. The forces of the insurgents were mainly composed of the youth of the Catalonia Left Republican Party, and of Socialists and worker-Communists. The workers made an attack on the naval aviation base, but were beaten off. The troops were compelled to bring artillery into action. A number of towns near Barcelona were in the hands of the workers (Sabadel, Repalot, Sandanola, Manres, Salson, Barcelona, Materro, Lerida, Tarragonio). In a number of localities in the provinces *the peasants rose up* in support of the workers. In Lerida the workers seized the radio station. In Sabadel the strikers took possession of the municipal hall and hauled up the flag of the autonomous republic as well as the Red flag.

The movement in Catalonia as far as can be judged from materials on hand, was headed by the "Alliance Obrero", in which the Communists did not play a decisive role. This explains why the movement in Catalonia had no united plan, why there was an absence of a firm leadership of the armed struggle which had begun, and why, in the long run, Catalonia did not play the part in these events that might have been expected.

A general strike was declared in Madrid from the first day of the events. In the working class quarters of Quatro, Caminos, Tetuan, etc., armed conflicts began between the workers and troops. The workers set up barricades. At first, the troops were helpless to cope with the workers. The workers undertook the offensive and attacked the center of the city. They attacked the parliament buildings, the offices of the Ministries of Home Affairs, Agriculture and Education, the police headquarters, and also the central telegraph station, barracks, and railway stations, and began to fire on the place occupied by Lerroux. The Communists succeeded in organizing a few radio transmitters. Up to the 12th of October armed conflicts with government troops continued to take place in a number of points in Madrid. A section of the aviation troops who were encamped at the

central airdrome in Madrid refused to take action against the workers. Not only were government troops sent against the workers, but so also were all the storm detachments of Gil Robles, Primo de Rivera and other fascist organizations. In Madrid where there was a tremendous concentration of government troops, the masses apparently were not sufficiently mobilized.

But, let us repeat, the first place in the heroic struggle of the workers in revolt belongs to Asturias and Biscay. In the night of the 4th and 5th of October, the uprising began in Asturias. On the 5th and 6th of October already *the whole of Asturias was in the hands of the workers.* The most important towns near the capital of Asturias, Oviedo, were seized by the workers, and Soviets were set up there. The miners surrounded Oviedo with a ring of steel. It is characteristic that the insurgents immediately proceeded to take the offensive. They occupied the main strategic points and began to direct artillery fire on the town. At the same time powerful armed detachments of miners moved forward from different ends of the town.

From the very beginning, not only were miners drawn into the movement—and they constituted the most powerful detachments there—but also the whole of the proletarian population and peasantry of Asturias. Tens of thousands of workers participated in stubborn revolutionary battles. The heroic struggle of the Asturian workers was developed under the slogan of *"Struggle for the Power of the Soviets". Soviets of workers and peasants were established in each town, in each village and in each peasant district.* The Soviets organized the struggle and revolutionary order. Decrees and orders were issued in the name of "the Workers' and Peasants' Government" or of "the Revolutionary Committee". Private property in the means of production and land was abolished.

The Soviets in Asturias organized the supply of the workers with arms and provisions. What strikes one's attention is that as soon as the workers seized the arsenal and other military enterprises, they immediately set them going full blast to produce military supplies. The workers of Asturias organized a Red Army which fought against the government troops, and held Oviedo, the capital of Asturias, in their hands until October 18. And the only thing that made it possible for the government troops to drive the workers out of the positions they occupied was that motor detachments, aviation, and poison gases, etc., were brought into action against the insurgents; naval forces were directed against the workers—the cruiser "Liberta" etc.; and the Foreign Legion was called in post haste, etc.

But after this, as well, fighting went on in the streets in Oviedo for three more days. The troops had to carry on a struggle for every house. And it was only on being hard pressed by the enemy that the workers beat a fighting retreat from Oviedo, and the basic mass of the armed workers, it should be borne in mind, left the city in full order. The insurgents left with arms in their hands and fortified themselves in Mieres and Turbi, and later retreated to the hills.

From the very beginning of the events in Asturias, the Communist Party and the Y.C.L. did not lose a moment and rallied all the members of the organizations for action. The Communists and Y.C.L.'ers were organized in groups of ten, with commanders. Due to the unexampled heroism of our camrades, the workers very often elected them as commanders of the red guard. From the very beginning of the uprising the Communists fought in the revolutionary committees against the Socialists with the demand that points of support for the uprising be established in the factories, and among the peasantry, and that the peasants, unemployed, and urban petty bourgeoisie be drawn into the struggle. At the same time the Communists pointed to the weak military-technical organization (liaison with the front, etc.).

From first to last our Party was in the leadership of the armed uprising. *In the course of the events, the Communists attained absolute preponderance not only in the workers' revolutionary committees, but also in the regional committee which was renewed during the uprising; after the desertion of the Asturian Socialist leader, Penya, and his adherents, the regional committee was almost completely in the hands of the Communists.* No sooner did the Communists begin to occupy the leading posts than the fighting enthusiasm increased. The workers flung themselves into battle, and themselves demanded that the Communists lead them. This was specially manifested on the day when Oviedo was stormed. *The Soviet regime lasted for 15 days in Asturias.*

Another center of the mass armed uprising was Biscay. In Bilbao bloody struggles took place and all the factories were occupied by the strikers. At the same time a stubborn struggle took place in Arboledo, Sesatto, Erandio, Baracaldo, Gallarta, Pucetta, Ortullia, Galdames.

In *Portugaletto* the struggle assumed the character of a real uprising from the very first moment. On the 5th, a revolutionary committee of the local Alliance was set up on the initiative of the Communist Party, in which Communists, Socialists and anarchists participated. The civil guard was surrounded and all arms were requisitioned from the bourgeoisie. So, also, were big stores of arms. The workers were masters of the city until the 10th.

In *Sesatto* power fell into the hands of the workers. The Socialists prevented the setting up of the Workers' Alliance and the participation of other

workers' organizations in the leadership of the struggle.

Baracaldo. A Workers' Alliance was set up, with the Socialists in the majority. The workers were masters of the city until the 10th.

Erandio. The united front with the Socialists was established, but no revolutionary committee of the Workers' Alliance was established. The workers were masters of the situation here from the 8th till the 10th.

Gallarta. A Workers' Alliance was established. But this Alliance kept to the tactics of the Socialists, and our comrades, in spite of the fact that the majority of the Socialist workers themselves were against their leaders, were unable to prevent these tactics being operated. The Socialists' and Communists' armed detachments were led by Communists. But they did not undertake an offensive against Bilbao, for they were deceived by the Socialist leaders.

In *Pucetta* a Workers' Alliance was set up with the Communists in the majority. The unemployed were successfully linked up with the movement by the issue of a decree about the distribution of foodstuffs among them. A Red Guard was established and arms were requisitioned. In the process of the struggle the Alliance was transformed into a Soviet. Being without leadership from the regional center, the comrades were held up by the expectation of instructions to assume the offensive on Bilbao together with other towns in this region. Although they bombarded the city from the air, the government troops only succeeded in entering the city on the 14th instant.

In *Arboledo,* a Workers' Alliance was established but the Socialists were in the majority there. A Red Militia was established to undertake a march on Bilbao. When the Socialists in their treachery succeeded in getting about 600 armed miners to return although they were six kilometers away from the town of Bilbao, the Communists committed an error in not taking the leadership of the struggle in spite of the decision of the Socialists.

When characterizing the process of the struggle in Biscay as a whole we must stress the point that especially in those places where the Communists were not in a position to head the struggle, or where in certain instances our comrades made mistakes, the Socialist organizations opposed the setting up of a united, centralized leadership of the uprising (the Socialists particularly hindered the establishment of a united regional leadership with the workers' organizations of various political trends, and even the Socialist youth organization was not represented in the leadership, etc.). Further, they did not organize Workers' and Peasants' Alliances or openly committed treachery (*e.g.,* in Arboleda, etc.).

The Communists showed that they were the real vanguard of the fighting workers. They undertook the initiative in the process of the struggle in setting up organs to lead the uprising (revolutionary committees of Workers' and Peasants' Alliances) and gave the Socialist and anarchist workers the following instructions:

Immediately organize Workers' and Peasants' Alliances, having in view their transformation into Soviets in the course of the struggle.

Confiscate all arms and take hostages. Organize armed detachments to undertake an offensive on the capital.

Confiscate printing presses and the banks.

The local Alliances to connect up with one another, and establish district Alliances.

In a number of cases, as the situation became more intense and the forms of struggle sharpened, the leadership of the struggle passed out of the hands of the Socialists into those of the Communists. This was conditioned by the growth of the authority of the Communist Party, and in a number of cases was due to the fact that the Socialists wished to relieve themselves of the responsibility for the further course of events.

In spite of all the weaknesses in the organization of the uprising in Biscay to which we have referred, the movement nonetheless attained such a range that *the general strike in this region lasted eight days, and for six days the workers were masters of this industrial mining region* and repulsed the attacks of the government troops.

As distinct from the defensive tactics applied by the Austrian proletariat during their armed struggle in the February days, the Spanish workers as a rule passed over to the offensive right from the very beginning, and seized the main strategic points (munition plants, arsenals, barracks, telegraphs, radio, etc.). There can be no doubt that the main mass of the arms with which the Spanish workers fought against the government troops were seized by the workers themselves, and were not received from the Socialists in the course of their military-technical preparations. The insurgents, where they received leadership, carried on a purposeful offensive and did not allow the enemy to collect his forces, and, what is also very characteristic, immediately took hostages from the camp of the bourgeoisie and the landowners.

In the districts seized, *Soviet Power was immediately established.* In the process of the struggle, the worker-peasant Alliances grew into organs of Soviet Power.

As soon as the power of the Soviets was established, *the latter immediately published a series of revolutionary measures and proceeded to carry them into life.*

Such were the characteristic features of the struggle of the Spanish working class in the October days.

THE BASIC LESSONS OF THE STRUGGLE, AND PROSPECTS

The Spanish proletariat displayed miraculous heroism and a firm will to victory. All this refers in the first instance to the really heroic proletariat of Red Asturias.

Why, however, is it that the Spanish proletariat was not victorious? The main reason was *the absence of adequate organizational and political preparation for the revolutionary uprising, and the weakness in organizing the revolution.* "The organization of the revolution", as the question is correctly put by the Communist Party of Spain in its manifesto, "is not only the mobilization of a group of persons who are filled with a strong will and who are 'prepared for everything', but is *the militant mobilization of all the class forces and of all the direct allies of the revolution, and primarily of the peasantry*".

Firstly, the organization of the revolution presupposes first and foremost the organization of the basic revolutionary force, namely, *the proletariat.* And undoubtedly *the basic reason* why the Spanish proletariat was unable to achieve victory is the fact that at the time of the general strike and uprising, the majority of the working class were under the leadership, not of the Communists, but of the Socialists and anarchists.

It is precisely the Socialists and anarchists who are primarily responsible for the fact that the proletariat was not victorious in the heroic October days.

The proletariat rushed into the battle for power. But the two parties which had most influence among the working class of Spain, the Socialist and anarchist parties, either did not set the proletariat the task of conquering power or else fought against it. And if, nonetheless, the Spanish proletariat fought for power under the banner of the Soviets in a number of most important districts in Spain (especially in the industrial North of Spain, mainly in Asturias), this implies *the tremendous historic victory of the idea of the Soviets, the victory of the Comintern and the Communist Party of Spain.*

Secondly, the *peasantry.* The peasantry were not inclined to defend the republic which had given them nothing, while the question of a new power was not set before them. Hence, the peasantry, in their majority, did not enter the struggle. And organized preparation was also missing. No peasant committees were set up to seize the land. It was only the Communists, when they entered the Alliance Obrero, who raised the question of drawing the peasants into the "Alliances" (Soviets) as organs of the uprising. It was only the Communist Party which (at the last moment) developed a program of revolutionary measures in the village which the workers' and peasants' government put into operation. But our program and our slogans did not succeed in penetrating into the very heart of the revolutionary village in Spain. The historic responsibility for the fact that the peasants did not support the proletariat in the October days lies on the Socialist and anarchist parties. That the toiling peasants could support the proletariat at the time of the uprising is shown by the example of Asturias, where the Communists exerted decisive influence over the whole course of events, where they were able to draw in and to unleash all the forces of the heroic miners of Asturias, and where, as a result of this, the peasantry joined in the struggle (in Asturias, Soviets were established in the villages and armed detachments were set up there which assisted the workers in their struggle against the government forces, etc.).

Thirdly, the hegemony of the proletariat was missing in the national revolutionary movement. The national revolutionary movement was headed by the bourgeois parties of the oppressed nationalities. The masses still had faith in these parties, and believed that the declaration by the Catalonian government (October 7) of the establishment of a Catalonian independent republic was the beginning of the struggle. But in actual fact, this was the *end* of the struggle as far as the "Catalonian Left" was concerned. Their cowardliness and half-heartedness was especially clearly revealed in the proposal made to General Batet, the commander of the garrison in Barcelona, to "think over" for an hour whether he would come over to the side of the Catalonian republic or not. This was enough for General Batet to issue the necessary instructions and to surround the palace. In fear of a revolution which set itself the task *not only* of national but also of *social liberation,* the "Catalonian Left", the Catalonian government, headed by Companis, capitulated to the Spanish counter-revolution. Thereby the national revolutionary movement turned out to be without leadership and was disorganized.

Fourthly, one of the most important reasons why the Spanish workers did not achieve victory is that in the main they did not succeed in drawing over the army to their side, and that the army in great part remained on the side of the government, although there was a noticeable ferment in the army and there were a number of cases of soldier mutinies (in Lerida, Camno, Cicon, Estramadura, on the outskirts of Barcelona, and in Madrid). A great responsibility for the position taken up by the army lies on the Spanish Socialists, who limited the sphere of their influence to the army's officers. They counted on the Republican leaders of the army, and not on the masses of the toilers in soldiers' uniforms. But the main reason why *the army did not pass over to the workers in revolt was that the necessary measures were not taken to ensure politically and organizationally that the peasants undertook action at the same time as the working class.*

Fifthly, bodies to lead the struggle were not estab-

lished everywhere. And apparently *no united central leadership on an all-Spanish scale was set up over the general strike and armed uprising.* This was the biggest mistake in the *organizational* preparation of the uprising. If a single party, the Party of the Communists, had led the struggle, a single purpose would have been in being. And if such a body had been set up, it would have taken on itself the organizational leadership over the whole process of the struggle, and the functions of provisional revolutionary government, and would have issued the most necessary decrees, for instance, regarding the handing of the land to the peasantry, etc. Had such been the case, events would undoubtedly have developed in a different fashion.

It was only in Asturias and partially in Biscay that the Communists *held a leading influence* in the revolutionary committee, although the decrees appeared over the signatures of the representatives of the two parties. And it must be added that the leading influence of the Communists was only won in the course of the uprising. In Asturias and Biscay, Soviets and a Red army, etc., were organized without delay. It was not for nothing *that the Soviets, Red Army, etc., were organized here without delay.* It was precisely Communist influence which aided in the organization of the scope and level of the struggle which we had in Asturias. This was assisted by the fact that, as the result of stubborn activity, the Communists were able in Asturias to secure powerful positions in the ranks of the working class, and succeeded in organizing cells in the factories and were able to build up the Workers' and Peasants' Alliances on a mass scale.

The supreme importance of the events that have taken place in Spain lies in the fact that the Spanish proletariat took the only correct path, namely, the path of the open struggle for Soviet power, for a workers' and peasants' republic, and that the experience of Asturias and Biscay, etc., showed that it is possible to bring about the mass arming of the proletariat in the process of the uprising, and that it is possible to smash up the State machine of the bourgeoisie (with the police, army, etc.) in the process of the armed uprising.

* * *

It is still early to make a final summing up of the results of the heroic story of the Spanish events. But the events that took place represent not the end of the developed struggle for power, for Soviets, but only its *beginning.* The main seat of the uprising, Red Asturias, has still not been completely overwhelmed. The struggle waged by Red Asturias continues to be the symbol of Spain in revolt in the past and present.

The Spanish proletariat did not achieve victory over fascism and did not succeed in establishing a workers' and peasants' republic. But although the Spanish counter-revolution has achieved a *temporary outcome of the present struggle* which is in its own favor, yet it has not achieved a decisive victory. The regime of military fascist dictatorship established is on the edge of a volcano. The gang of clerical fascist hangmen is by no means master of the situation. The whole of the clerical fascist dictatorship is extremely unstable and shaken. At any moment we may expect such a turn of events as will explode the domination of the brutal counter-revolution. The Spanish bourgeoisie itself senses this, and does not believe in a bright future. The bourgeoisie wishes by means of terror, military field tribunals, the gallows and the arrest of tens of thousands of revolutionary workers to postpone the day of its inevitable doom.

The Spanish proletariat has not been smashed. No decisive turn has taken place now in the situation which has lasted for years, where neither the camp of revolution nor the camp of the counter-revolution has been in the position to destroy one another.

The first general militant offensive of the Spanish proletariat has been beaten off. But the idea which the Spanish proletariat has been lacking for years has penetrated at last into the minds of the broad masses of the proletariat in the process of these struggles, namely, that *the struggle for power can be the only aim of the struggle and only the Soviets can be that power.* This idea which has taken hold of the masses has become a tremendous material force. Herein lies the guarantee that new decisive battles are *near,* but on the basis of a realignment of forces, on the basis of the masses taking into account the extremely rich revolutionary experience of the October events.

The experience of the masses themselves, assisted by the energetic influence of the Communist Party, will help them not only to appreciate the role of allies in the revolution (primarily the peasants and the oppressed nationalities), but will also help the proletariat, headed by the Communist Party, to become their real leader. Thereby will the task be solved of the abolition of the gap between the proletarian, the peasant, and national revolutionary movements.

The experience will also not be in vain for the army as well which will continue to become more unstable. But this will not take place of itself. *The work of the Communists among the peasantry, the toiling nationalities and in the army, is one of the most important conditions for the preparation of the maturing new all-popular uprising.*

The conquest of the majority of the working class by the Communist Party is the main decisive condition for a victorious armed uprising against fascism and in the struggle for Sovet Power. The October battles have created all the conditions for the speedy

conquest of the majority of the working class under the banner of Communism.

The Confederation of Labor, led by the anarchists, has been exposed as the "Black Hundreds" of the Spanish counter-revolution. The working class in Spain will never forget that in the days when the general strike and armed uprising took place, when not only the whole of the revolutionary, but also of the "Left" bourgeois press were prohibited, the central paper of the Spanish anarchists appeared in Barcelona, alongside the fascist monarchist newspaper, and that it spattered the fighting Communards of Spain with dirt. And if the December putsch of 1933, organized by the anarchists, was a turning point in the development of their movement, if a fall in their mass influence began to take place at that time, then the October battles will be the beginning of the *end* of the influence of the anarchists in Spain. And in Spanish conditions this is a most important point.

On the other hand, the program, tactics and slogans of the Socialist Party of Spain have gone completely bankrupt in the fire of struggle; only the line, tactics and slogans of the Communist Party have withstood the test. This is now becoming ever clearer to the widest masses. There can be no doubt that a deep process of differentiation will take place in the Socialist Party of Spain. The Right section, headed by Besteiro, etc., will attempt to purchase legality and to become the official leadership of the Socialist Party. On the other hand, there will be a process of differentiation among those Socialist workers and organizations which followed the Left majority headed by Largo Caballero. *Our Party will facilitate the mastery of the experience of the heroic struggle.* Our Party must mobilize all the hatred of the masses against the anarchist and Socialist leaders who betrayed the cause of the revolutionary workers, who rose in struggle for power.

And now more than ever before, the workers concerned will become convinced of the incorrectness and of the bankruptcy of the programmatic and tactical line of the Socialist Party.

This is why we shall see a rapid process of the radicalization of the Socialist and anarchist workers in Spain, and a rapidly increasing pace at which the C.P. of Spain will become transformed into the only *mass party* of the Spanish proletariat.

But the speed and depth of this process will depend upon the activity and work of the Communist Party of Spain.

Decisive battles are near in Spain. The task facing our Party is to prevent the consolidation of the power of the victors for a single hour, by an uninterrupted, tireless, partisan struggle in all its forms. The task facing our Party is to speed up the realignment of forces which is necessary for a victory of the revolution in the forthcoming new upsurge of the revolutionary wave. The task facing the Communist Parties of all countries is to develop international proletarian solidarity action with the heroic Spanish proletariat in spite of the sabotage of the leadership of the Second International.

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THE QUESTION OF COMMUNIST CADRES

By CHERNOMORDIK

"In this, the Central Committee was guided by the great thought uttered by Lenin, namely, that the main thing in organizational work is—the selection of people and supervision of fulfillment of decisions." (Stalin, Report at the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.)

THE approach of the second round of revolutions and wars, the fascization of a number of countries, and the upsurge of the revolutionary movement raise especially sharply before the Parties of the Comintern the question of rapidly putting an end to the state of affairs where the Parties in organizational respects lag behind the political tasks which face them. The struggle for proletarian and supremely devoted Party cadres, trained in a Bolshevik manner and steeled in battle, is a decisive element in Bolshevization at the present stage. The sharpening of the class struggle in all countries has greatly increased the demands made on the leading cadres in all the Party and mass organizations, from the Party cell to the Central Committee, and from the Red factory committees to the leaders of the trade unions.

The influence of the Party is growing, the united front of the proletariat is extending, the network of mass organizations close to the Party is increasing, and the number of Party organizations and of their members is rising. In each of these organizations it is necessary to ensure that the line of the Party and the Comintern will really be carried through by reliable and firm Bolshevik Party workers.

Since the Sixth Congress there has been a big increase in the number of countries where the Communist Party has been driven underground. This means that the fascist terror is systematically tearing from the ranks of the Party those Party workers who are most valuable and who possess the most authority among the masses. It means that we must have sufficient forces not only to ensure that the work is carried on today but also to provide reserves to take the place of those Party workers who are arrested, killed, or forced to flee the country. The vast majority of the Sections of the E.C.C.I. in the capitalist countries have been driven underground. Only thirteen Sections are still legal, and even this legality is of a very limited character.

There is no need to mention the fact that political work in the factories, the army or the navy, is severely persecuted even in the most "democratic" countries where the Party is legal. Twenty-two of our Parties which were legal at the time of the Sixth Congress have been driven completely underground. The fascist terror, which can only be compared with the inquisition of the Middle Ages, brings with it such enormous losses in the Party membership and in the leading cadres that the question of extensively promoting, training and preparing new cadres becomes decisive not only for the successful work of the Party but even for its very existence.

The directives of the Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. to all Parties on the necessity of preparing for the most harsh conditions of illegality refer to the need for preparing highly qualified cadres in all Party bodies in numbers hitherto unknown. We will give a few figures to illustrate this. According to the figures of the International Red Aid, the number of revolutionaries killed in 1928 was 192,290; in 1933 the number had grown to 429,722, *i.e.*, the number killed in a single year had trebled, while the number arrested increased from seven to nine times, not including Germany, where the number of people arrested and killed cannot be determined. The number of Party members in the concentration camps has reached as high as 100,000. It is easy to understand that our leading cadres are the first to suffer.

In Germany the number of members of the Central Committee and the District Committees, and the number of Party functionaries killed and arrested, amounts to two-thirds of their total number. Comrade Thaelmann and a number of prominent Party leaders are in the clutches of fascism. Comrade Scheer and tens and hundreds of other Party workers have been killed.

In Japan, China and Poland, tens of leading Party workers in the Central and District Party Committees were arrested and murdered from 1928 to 1933.

The rapidity with which the leading cadres change in countries where the Parties are illegal is shown by some figures collected regarding the Latvian Party. In 1931 out of sixteen persons on Party work, six were arrested before they had been six months at work and four remained at their posts for about a year. In 1932, out of ten persons, seven were arrested within six months. We find the same state of affairs in other Parties as well.

Thus the quantitative side of the matter alone raises problems absolutely unparalleled hitherto in the matter of training cadres. Quantity, however, is not the only point. The situation itself makes new demands on these Party workers. In the conditions of legality it was much simpler to carry out our line. We could act through the legal press, the numerous documents,

and could speak of the tasks we set ourselves from the Parliamentary tribune, at big meetings, etc. In most countries it is now no longer possible to do this. All activity is illegal. By no means can all questions be answered in time by the Center, even the most important ones, and the lower organizations cannot always succeed in getting instructions, and so they have to adopt a course independently. And thus the ability to adopt an independent course in a complicated situation, to carry out boldly the Party line without waiting for directions from above, is a most important quality required from Party workers. It is much more difficult, nowadays, to adopt a course oneself. The number of class struggles and their intensity have increased many times, while every question set by life and the struggle demands a rapid and decisive reply.

Circumstances have become much more complex now that the united front is being operated on a wide scale, and that the broad masses of social-democratic workers, anarchists and non-party workers have to be organized into a single class column with the Communists and the Red trade unions. The demands which are being made now, more than ever before, are to be able to discover all waverings and doubts and to carry on our Bolshevik line correctly, to be able to work among the masses and draw over to our side the workers who are prejudiced against Bolshevik tactics, and to be able to organize powerful contacts with the broad masses of workers.

Finally, cadres need to be established to learn the art of conducting underground and conspiratorial work, and who will be able to guard the Party against police terror. The Party workers must display a high degree of vigilance, and must be able to awaken this vigilance among the broad masses. To secure a knowledge of the complicated technique of conspiracy in the Party and to acquire the ability to apply it while maintaining wide contacts with the masses, is the task to the solution of which each Party worker has to devote a great deal of work.

The Comintern comes to the Seventh Congress solid and united around the Leninist-Stalinist general line, around its leader, Comrade Stalin. The time that has passed since the Sixth Congress is distinguished first and foremost by the unprecedented consolidation of the Parties and of the Party leadership in all the Parties, as well as by the growth of their authority. Since the Sixth Congress there has not been any big attempt at oppositional activity against the Comintern on an international scale, no serious factional groups in the various countries, and this is an important sign of the growth and Bolshevization of the Parties. None the less, the occasional attacks on the Party line by prominent Party workers, the existence of renegades and even of provocateurs who have left the Party and betrayed it, raise the question of the necessity in the future of selecting the cadres for the leading organs of the Party more vigilantly and carefully. The actions of Remmele and Neumann in the German Party, of Gutmann in the Czechoslovakian Party, and of the Seler-Barbe and Doriot group in France, etc., show that the intensifying class struggle requires a more careful selection of leading cadres.

The exposure of a number of provocateurs by the Parties (Zharsky, Bratkovski and others in Poland, Katner in Germany, Seler in France, and Krastin in Latvia), shows that the protection of the Party cadres, the struggle for Bolshevik conspiracy and control over the actions of the cadres and the members of the leading Party bodies are not yet at the necessary high level. In spite of tremendous successes in the selection and the consolidation of the leadership of the Parties, there are still many cases in which a frivolous attitude is taken towards the selection of cadres. People are allowed to enter the most important Party bodies without sufficient check being made of them, and then it turns out that their work has helped the struggle of the fascist police against the Party. From this point of view, special attention must be paid to those sections of our Party mass work which are frequently the most vulnerable in face of the attack of our class enemies.

The experience of a number of Parties, including the Polish Party, shows that elements leaving the nationalist camp frequently come into the Communist Party with destructive aims. While drawing into the Party the elements who are honest and loyal to the Party, it is nevertheless necessary to watch and check up on them more carefully then hitherto so that the agents of the class enemy will not get into the Party along with them.

On the other hand, particularly strict demands must be made on non-proletarian elements before they are accepted into the leading Party bodies. A case which speaks eloquently enough of this is that of Kuki, an obviously bourgeois type who was admitted into the leadership of the Japanese Party after being a Party member about a year and a half, thus making it possible for him to concentrate the finances and technical contacts of the Party in his own hands, and who afterwards proved to be a provocateur.

And, finally, the third point is that of the technical apparatus. It is now an elementary rule that politically colorless and insufficiently verified people cannot be admitted into the technical apparatus of an illegal Party. Nonetheless, cases can still be observed where the technical apparatus is entrusted to casual people (Latvia, Japan, Finland, etc.), and the latter either prove to be police agents or betray the Party as soon as they are subjected to police examination.

A decisive question in the Bolshevik policy of cadres is the struggle for the proletarian composition

of the leading Party bodies. In this respect the Comintern and its Parties have undoubtedly achieved great successes. We have material from nineteen Parties showing that out of 497 members of the Central Committees, 321 or 64.5 per cent are workers, and it should be borne in mind in this connection that the proportion of workers in the European Parties is much higher than in the Communist Parties of the Eastern countries where the workers constitute an insignificant stratum.

It is obvious that such results have not been achieved automatically. The examples of some C.C.s serve to show how the proportion of workers has increased from one election to another. The composition of the C.C. of the C.P. of France shows this with sufficient clearness:

Members and candidates of the C.C. elected at the Congress in Tours in 1920	32	persons, of whom 4 were workers and the remainder lawyers, doctors, journalists, and professors.	
C.C. elected at Marseilles in 1921	27	persons, of whom 3 were workers.	
C.C. " Paris in 1922	32	"	6 "
C.C. " Lyons in 1924	37	"	11 "
C.C. " Lille in 1926	80	"	39 "
C.C. " St. Denis in 1929	69	"	48 "
Present C.C. elected at the Congress in Paris in 1932	64	"	49 are "

We see the same in the C.C. of the C.P. of Spain. In 1920, out of 10 members of the C.C., 6 were workers; in 1921-24, out of 16 members of the C.C., 9 were workers: in 1925, out of 8 members of the C.C., 3 were workers; in 1925-29, out of 11 members of the C.C., 8 were workers; in 1929-31 out of 17 members of the C.C., 13 were workers; in 1931, out of 35 members of the C.C., 26 were workers.

In the C.C. of the C.P. of the U.S.A., in 1919, only 7 out of the 22 members were workers, but in 1934, out of 35 members and candidates, 25 are workers.

In the Communist Parties of the East, the workers constitute a *minority* in all the C.C.s. For example, in the C.P. of Japan, out of 9 members of the C.C., 4 are workers; in the C.P. of Turkey, out of 31 members of the C.C., 9 are factory workers and 20 office workers; in the C.P. of India, out of 9 members of the C.C., 2 are workers and 7 office clerks.

It is quite natural that there are very few workers in the C.C.s of the Communist Parties of the Eastern countries. It is, however, not natural that in the C.C.s of the Parties in the Eastern countries the majorities consist not of peasants, which would be easy to understand, but of office workers and intellectuals.

The picture in the lower organizations is entirely different. Matters here are as yet not as they should be. Spontaneity dominates, as a result of which there is not yet a firm proletarian majority in the lower organizations. The C.P. of Italy stands out prominently in this respect, as its lower organizations have no core of leading cadres who are workers. Things are not much better in the other Parties with the exception of Germany, Poland, Great Britain and the United States.

The fact that spontaneity is to blame for this is proved by the example of a number of Eastern countries (Japan, Turkey, South Africa), where the majority of the lower Party organs consist of workers (*e.g.*, out of 15 members of District Committees and Town Committees, 11 are workers). In places where even the slightest attention is paid to the question of the selection of proletarian cadres, a proletarian majority is ensured.

In the C.P. of the U.S.A., the social position of the Party District Organizers is such that 21 out of 24 are workers.

The task of bringing about a decisive increase in the proportion of workers in the leading Party bodies must be raised in a most urgent manner. This applies especially to the Central Committees of the Parties of the Eastern countries and the middle and lower leading Party bodies in all countries.

The growth of the influence of the Communist Party among the masses, the growth in the volume of the work and the network of Party organizations, on the one hand, and the enormous losses as the result of the terror on the other hand, raise very urgently the question of *promoting* new cadres of working class origin.

The majority of Parties do not pay sufficient attention to this task. An indirect proof of this is the fact that among the above mentioned 436 members of C.C.s in 19 countries, only 69 comrades, or 16 per cent, joined the Party after 1929.

There is no doubt that it is a positive feature that there is a stable backbone of comrades in the Central Committees of the Parties, who joined the Party before 1923, *i.e.*, comrades who took part in the first struggles for the Party, and who have great experience in the struggle. Out of the 436 comrades, 233, or 51 per cent, come in this category. The attraction of new forces, however, would increase the contacts of the Party with the masses, and would make it possible to utilize widely the experience of these "old" members.

Of course, new forces are promoted in the lower Party bodies, especially in the illegal Parties, when police raids make it essential to replace arrested comrades by new ones. Unfortunately, this often takes place spontaneously without previous preparations and *without serious verification and selection* of the individuals concerned. As a result cases exist in which the arrest of our Party committees is followed by their spontaneous replacement by new ones which prove to be police agents especially sent for the purpose (Hungary, Poland, Rumania).

We should raise here the question of the need for stubborn struggle to attract workers from the leading industries of the given district or country into the leading Party committees from top to bottom. Up to now workers in metal, mining and chemical industries have been worse represented in the composition of the leading Party bodies than workers employed in other industries. This shows to some extent the weakness of our contacts with such factories. It cannot be doubted, however, that there is a sufficient number of loyal metal workers, miners, chemical workers, seamen, etc., in the Parties, and it would doubtless increase the attractive power and influence of the Party organizations if such comrades were brought into the leading Party committees. Another fact shows that special attention should be paid to this side of the matter. At its last Plenum, the Y.C.I. stated that in a number of the Y.C.L. Central Committees there is an absence or very poor representation of Y.C.L.-ers employed in the leading industries. For example, the C.C. of the Y.C.L. of Great Britain contains no seamen, while the C.C. of the Y.C.L. of Spain contains no miners.

Of all these questions the decisive one is that of the need for a thorough change in the direction of boldly promoting new cadres. What we need at present is not the haphazard promotion of individuals; we require scores, hundreds and even thousands of new leading workers in all branches of our work. "Where can they be found?" This question is the answer most frequently given to the reproaches made about weaknesses in the promotion of new cadres. We will try to indicate at least a few of the sources.

The whole world was witness to a classic example of the struggle of a proletarian revolutionary at the Leipzig trial. Comrade Dimitroff demonstrated the strength of a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist orientation, and his boldness in the struggle against the enemy.

At present, in the conditions of the fascist regime, scores and hundreds of trials are taking place against Communists, workers and revolutionaries. At each of these trials there are scores of young Dimitroffs who are passing through a stern school and trial for Bolshevik firmness in the police dungeons of the Gestapo, the Sigurantsi, the Polish "defenzio", the Japanese and Chinese police. Every Party should know and should widely popularize among the masses the personalities of such tried fighters, and should entrust the fate of the Party and the Party organizations first of all to them. People who have passed through the modern "third degree" at the hands of the modern police forces and have emerged honorably from this trial must become the iron fund from which we shall obtain new cadres. The task is here merely to be really sure that the given comrade acted as a Communist should. The exemplary behavior displayed by Comrade Dimitroff as to how a Communist should behave in court has found numerous disciples and followers.

In September, 1934, at a trial of 40 workers, all the accused (including 5 women), led by Comrade Fogt, behaved steadfastly, boldly accused their "judges", and defended their Party. In the court and on the road from the court building to the jail, they greeted the workers who had organized a demonstration.

In Berlin six workers were on trial for their work in the International Workers' Aid. Comrade Annelore Ache defended the honor of working class solidarity, and compelled the court to listen to her till the end. In Austria, comrades who took part in the February struggles provided a whole series of steadfast and splendidly disciplined revolutionaries who behaved steadfastly in the court, and even in face of execution. For example, the 20-year old Schutzbundler Joseph Gerl declared: "My ideal is above my life."

In Rumania, the trial of railway workers lasted for 36 days. In their manifesto issued in connection with this trial, the C.C. of the C.P. of Rumania justly refers to the names of the workers' leaders, Doychev, Petroscu, Georgiu, and other "Dimitroffs of the Rumanian working class". Similar examples were to be found at the Lutsk trial in Poland, and the Plovdivski trial in Bulgaria, etc.

In Berlin a 14-year old boy declared in court: "I distributed the leaflets because the Communists are for the workers, and Hitler is against them."

The class struggle which is sharpening in all countries has proved "unexpectedly" how some recognized leaders remain in the shade at the moment of decisive struggles, while rank-and-file Communist workers, members of the reformist trade unions, social-democratic workers, and anarchist workers, who have hitherto been unnoticed, come out in the foremost positions and fight like lions, at the same time displaying exceptional ability as organizers, and winning the boundless love of the fighting masses. Asturias in Spain, the general strike in France, the miners in Belgium, the textile workers in America, the railwaymen in Bucharest, etc.—such are the sources of hundreds of new leaders.

A serious question is that of decisively promoting

to leading work those workers who come to the Communist Party from the Social-Democratic Party, the anarchists, etc. In some places, owing to the large number of arrests among Communists, the social-democrats who have recently joined our Party form almost the entire leadership and frequently they work well. Such leaders, however, frequently suffer from relapses to reformism and relics of social-democracy. In other organizations, on the contrary, there is a sectarian fear of allowing former social-democrats to get into the leadership. On the basis of the experience accumulated during the last year or two, it is necessary now to establish a definite line on this question. What should be the criterion? We should decisively put an end to the prejudice that a social-democratic past, especially when workers are in question, is an insurmountable hindrance, preventing a comrade becoming a good proletarian revolutionary. If an ex-social-democrat has shown his qualities in the struggle, if he has fought well in strikes, in armed struggles and in conducting the united front, and has come to our Party, then he is one of us and he must be utilized, and advanced to leading work according to his ability and authority among the masses. Such comrades must be given great assistance in their practical activity and must be helped to outlive their social-democratic prejudices and survivals by experience, if they have not rid themselves of them before joining the Party.

The Austrian Communist Party acted boldly and well when they placed a considerable number of ex-Schutzbund members and social-democrats in the C.C. If the work of the C.C. is correctly organized, such a step can undoubtedly bring about great results in winning the broad masses of past and present social-democratic workers to our side.

Unfortunately, there is a certain stereotyped form used in estimating a worker when promoting and utilizing him. This is the length of his Party membership and his political education. Of course, if a long term of membership in the Party shows that a comrade participated in the revolutionary class struggles of the 1918-1923 period, the period most characteristic as regards the class struggles for the given country, this undoubtedly is of importance. But a long period of Party membership is not sufficient by itself. What is wanted is that the comrade should prove today in practice that he is really a worthy member of his Party. If there are comrades who are more capable and active in the struggle, now, they should be advanced in every way even if they are younger.

The same applies to political knowledge. The Party contains a considerable number of people who have studied in well-known Party schools. From the Sixth Congress to the present time, 3,221 persons have studied at long-term schools. These comrades, of course, have a Marxist training, yet nevertheless, when they are placed on leading work directly after finishing their schooling, in most cases, positive results do not follow. Is it not better that such comrades who have accumulated a big volume of knowledge but who have not been connected with practical work for a considerable time, should be sent to do mass work in the lower Party organizations, and be promoted gradually to do more important work, in proportion to their abilities, in proportion to the authority they win among the masses? An exception may be made only in the case of those comrades who went to study after being on leading work with which they were well able to cope.

A few words about the *check-up of the fulfillment of decisions* in connection with the problem of cadres. A great deal has been said about the importance of every Party committee and every Central Committee fulfilling decisions taken, about the importance of checking up on the fulfillment of decisions, and the majority of Party members are clear on this point, although it is still not carried into practice. But the verification of the fulfillment of decisions can be one of the most important weapons for the education and promotion of new cadres, and can also be a measure for the struggle against stagnation and bureaucracy. If a check is taken on how and by whom every decision is fulfilled, we shall get to know people better, and know them not only from their biography, but from practical work, and shall find those who are most capable and suitable for promotion. It seems to us that this lever for the education and selection of cadres has so far been very badly used.

Finally, a few words especially on the question of the education of Party cadres. It is clear to everyone that Bolshevik cadres are trained first and foremost on practical work, in the struggle. To contrast schools to practical work, or to attempt to prove that school training is as valuable as practical experience, is an absurdity which is obvious to everyone. But the school combined with practical work, may produce very big results. Present-day circumstances force us to make a serious change on this question. Hitherto the majority of the Parties have, on the whole, organized their work on the basis of long-term schools, *i.e.*, advanced Party schools. In practice this means that the Party sends a worker to study for one, two or sometimes three years. This gives a good effect in the sense of the knowledge obtained by the comrade, although, of course, even a long-term schooling cannot give a comrade a finished Marxist-Leninist education.

On the other hand, a long-term course of study has its negative sides. Firstly, the Party cannot always spare its basic and most competent cadres for such a long period, and secondly, the long term of study results in the comrade losing contacts with the work in his sphere of activity, so that when he returns he lags to some degree behind the movement.

If we take the last two years, then we see from the example of a considerable number of countries (France, Germany, Spain, Austria, Belgium and even Holland) what is meant by separation from practical work for the years 1933-34. This separation does not allow them to see all the new features that have arisen in the country and this is an irreparable loss. But such a growth of the working class movement is taking place in all the chief countries. Therefore, we should take a definite line for the mass development of short practical courses, lasting from two to four months, which will help the comrades to some degree to generalize their practical experience and will give them a certain amount of knowledge such as is necessary *today* for the direct struggle. The long-course school should be continued both to prepare leaders of these short-course schools, and to raise the qualifications of various comrades.

The illegal conditions in which our Parties work also show the necessity for such a change in the system of training cadres.

A great deal has already been done in the organization of the studies themselves, so as to bring the studies nearer to the practical tasks facing the Parties, but only the first steps have been taken in this connection. The content and methods of study must be changed in such a way that every Party member who has passed through a Party school will emerge better equipped for practical work, will be more firm in the struggle than he was before going to the school. Unfortunately, it has not always been possible to achieve this.

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THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR ANNUAL CONVENTION

By I. MINGULIN

THE Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor closed on October 13, 1934. This convention deserves special attention because it took place when the working class of the United States of America had already passed through a period of big class battles and had already tested the policy of the bourgeoisie—the policy of the N.I.R.A. in life. This policy had the utmost support of the leaders of the A. F. of L. Big changes had already taken place in the A. F. of L. itself, and the working class of the U.S.A., in its class struggles against the policy of the bourgeoisie, was faced with the enormous task of organizing its ranks independently.

The convention took place on the crest of the wave of the labor movement in the U.S.A., which was expressed particularly in the big strike wave of 1933-34. This struggle of the working class was directed towards defending the daily interests of the workers, against the offensive of capital, against the policy of fascization and war pursued by the American bourgeoisie, which is ever increasingly calling for a struggle against the whole capitalist system in the U.S.A.

The A. F. of L. convention lasted for about two weeks. It took place in San Francisco, the center of the heroic general strike of 125,000 workers in July of this year. But the calling of the convention in San Francisco by no means signified that the leaders of the A. F. of L. wanted to offer a tribute of respect to the unanimous struggle of the San Francisco workers.

San Francisco, which in the past has been the center of sharp class conflicts, has been in the last years comparatively quiet. The fathers of the town —the Republicans—set the tone of political life and did everything to foster the open shop. So that the calculation of the A. F. of L. leaders from their point of view was correct.

But of late the A. F. of L. leaders have more than once found themselves in a position where they were proposing and the workers disposing. So it was in this case, also. San Francisco, which was comparatively "peaceful", has been converted by the will of the workers into an arena of the biggest strike struggles since the 1919-1920 strikes. This has happened against the will of the Federation leaders. The strike-breaking position adopted by the leaders, and especially Green, towards the strike in San Francisco, has called forth strong indignation among the A. F. of L. members. It was, therefore, obviously inconvenient to change the place chosen for the convention. The A. F. of L. leaders, then, tried to make their October convention in San Francisco something in the nature of a demonstration against the July general strike in San Francisco. As the conservative New York *Times* wrote, the report of the Executive Council of the A. F. of L. to the convention "is not radical".

However, on examining the work of the convention more closely, we find that things are not quite so simple; even the A. F. of L. leaders, well known for their frank sympathy towards capitalism, could not entirely ignore the enormous changes which have taken place in the country and among the working class.

To begin with, we might mention even that this time, in spite of tradition, the Governor of California, Merriam, who led the fierce repressions against the strikers, was not invited to the convention to greet the delegates on their arrival in "his" State. This did not prevent the stage from being adorned with a huge portrait of Roosevelt, whose representative, Johnson, arrived in San Francisco during the strike for the express purpose of conducting the campaign against the "Reds".

We shall first of all deal with those questions on which the convention adopted a definite decision after the discussion, *viz.*, the questions of the attitude of the A. F. of L. to the N.R.A., the 30-hour working week, the industrial type of trade union. Resolutions concerning the mass labor party, unemployment insurance, and the legal prohibition of company unions, were also passed, without any discussion having taken place at all, and the resolution on the formation of a mass labor party was rejected. Unlike the preceding conventions, at this one questions of the international labor movement occupied a quite prominent position.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE A. F. OF L. TO THE N.R.A.

Over sixteen months had passed between the opening of the A. F. of L. convention and the introduction of the N.R.A., the backbone of the Roosevelt policy. Sufficient time has passed to make it possible to judge the policy of the N.R.A., not only by its words, but by its deeds. Who has been right in the appraisal of the N.R.A., and who has occupied a correct position towards the N.R.A.?

In spite of all the demagogic noise raised around the question of "New Deal", the Communist Party

and the advanced workers of the United States gave their estimate of the N.R.A. from the very beginning, as the policy of monopolist capitalism, a policy of fascization and war, directed against the interests of the working class. Consequently, from the very beginning, they considered it their task to fight against this policy and to show up its demagogic, lying phraseology. It was particularly necessary to do the latter, since it is not particularly easy for the average worker to understand the imperialist essence of the N.R.A., as an attempt to find a way out of the crisis at the expense of the working class and the toiling class as a whole. This policy was disguised behind a thick covering of pretty phrases and promises. The N.R.A. held out promises to the workers about freedom of organization into trade unions, increased wages, freedom from the curse of mass unemployment, etc. The Communists pointed out that all these promises were being given merely for the purpose of deceiving the workers, of sowing doubts in their minds, and thereby preventing the working class from acting in union against the policy of the capitalists.

The leaders of the A. F. of L. occupied just the opposite position, declaring that the N.R.A. was the "new charter for labor". The resolution passed at the previous year's convention of the A. F. of L. was in this spirit. The leaders of the Socialist Party went still further, and declared the N.R.A. to be "a step towards socialism". Correspondingly, the A. F. of L. leaders turned all their energies to getting support among the workers for the Roosevelt policy of the N.R.A., and themselves took part in the various organs created under the N.R.A.

Of course, the A. F. of L. policy being such, the workers could achieve nothing. In a series of cases they did not support the anti-strike policy of the leaders of the A. F. of L. In spite of them, the workers fought against the N.R.A., and thus forced the owners and the government to make certain concessions on questions of recognizing the trade unions, increasing wages, restricting the company unions, paying out relief benefits, etc. Although many strikes were isolated and scattered, nevertheless all these strikes formed one continuous big strike wave culminating in the San Francisco general strike and the general strike of 500,000 textile workers. Had the leaders of the A. F. of L. led the workers in a struggle against the N.R.A., instead of supporting its policy, the result, of course, would have been utterly different. But the leaders of the A. F. of L. did not want to adopt a different policy, and as the convention shows, they even now have no desire to do so.

Had the A. F. of L. leaders wanted to tell the workers the truth, they would have been forced to admit that the Communists had been right on the question of the N.R.A., and that the leaders of the A. F. of L. had helped the capitalists by the position they adopted. However, instead of this, the leaders of the A. F. of L. used a cunning maneuver which once more deceived the workers. Moreover, it is absolutely clear that this new betrayal is brought about in agreement with the Roosevelt administration.

This maneuver consists in the leaders of the A. F. of L. occupying a very critical position towards the "old" N.R.A., the N.R.A. before its reorganization. This is an attempt to tell the workers only part of the truth about the N.R.A., and to put all the blame, as it were, at this late date, on the "deceased". It shows that the A. F. of L. leaders reckon in such an easy way to shirk their responsibility before the workers, for the support they have given to the N.R.A. and for the negative results that this policy has brought to the workers. Now that the whole of the bourgeoisie is criticizing the "defects" of the N.R.A. in one way or another, when a wave of distrust, of protest and struggle has risen up among the working class against the policy of the N.R.A., the A. F. of L. has also thought fit to adopt a "critical position". From such a policy no harm comes to the bourgeoisie and the workers may be satisfied by their tone.

What did the Executive Council of the A. F. of L. say at the convention about the results of the N.R.A. policy? The E.C. report is a miserable, disgraceful document, full of complaints and feeble criticism, flavored with equally feeble threats. The E.C. complains that the N.R.A. has not raised the standard of living of the workers, nor fulfilled their promise of a system of collective agreements, and that the minimum wage is now becoming the workers' maximum wage:

> ". . . In many industries codes have meant a very real decrease in wages and earnings rather than an increase, and large numbers of workers find themselves today in a less favored position, economically, than they were a year ago. . . .
>
> "Average weekly earnings have decreased in automobiles, iron and steel, paper and pulp, and wool textiles.
>
> ". . . These millions of workers have less purchasing power today than they had a year ago."

The report makes particularly bitter confessions in connection with the famous Section 7a of the N.I.R.A. concerning collective agreements.

> "It is in regard to Section 7a that the most cruel disillusion of the workers regarding the N.R.A. has occurred. Convinced that they were protected in doing so, hundreds of thousands—even millions—of workers joined unions. But employer resistance to organization in bona fide unions was by no means destroyed or even weakened by the adoption of this portion of the law.

> Willing to accept the benefits which the codes brought them through relaxation in the anti-trust laws and through elimination of destructive competition, they had no intention of complying with their responsibilities under the collective bargaining portion of the Act.
>
> "Workers who joined unions in good faith, therefore, found themselves dismissed for no other reason than that they had accepted, at face value, the promises contained in the law. . . ."

The A. F. of L. leaders were thus compelled to admit that during the last year the position of the workers both economically and politically has been defined not by the deceptive promises of the N.R.A., but by the real policy of starvation, political reaction, fascism and war, pursued by the owners.

The leaders of the A. F. of L. are making these confessions in order to escape from the criticism of the workers. The Communists and advanced workers are using these confessions to show up the truth, to reveal the policy of the capitalists, the Roosevelt policy. The Communists will show the workers that the leaders of the A. F. of L. are responsible for this policy because of the line they pursued in supporting the N.R.A.

But the criticism of the "old" N.R.A. by the A. F. of L. leaders is not only a one-sided reckoning with the "deceased". This criticism should make it possible for them to continue their policy of conciliation with Washington and the "new" N.R.A. in the future.

It was no accident that Roosevelt made his speech concerning the reorganization of the N.R.A., on the eve of the opening of the A. F. of L. convention. On September 30, in the evening, Roosevelt proposed the establishment of the six-months' test period of "confidence", as it were, "peace" in industry between the workers and bosses. And this proposal was made when the reorganization of the N.R.A. was giving the owners still more freedom, in violating those paragraphs of the industrial codes which should apparently deal with the interests of the workers. It was made when the owners increased the offensive against the standard of living of the workers, when real wages fell in consequence of the high cost of living, when unemployment increases and unemployment benefits are being cut down, when the owners are still more ardently campaigning against workers' organizations and substituting them with company unions. It is perfectly obvious that, this being the case, Roosevelt's appeal for a six-months' "truce" is nothing else than a proposal that the workers submissively consent to a worsening of their economic and political position. And this is the "new" N.R.A.

What did the A. F. of L. leaders reply to this appeal? On the very day the convention opened they showed clearly that they were fully in support of the Roosevelt policy. Green, the President of the A. F. of L., in his opening speech, greeted Roosevelt's speech which, it appears, was "speaking the same language as labor". Green was extremely resourceful in making Roosevelt's strike-breaking proposals acceptable to the delegates, for although there were no more than a dozen representatives of the organized opposition at the convention, the mood of the rank and file could not but affect the convention to a certain extent. When, after his praiseworthy speech to Roosevelt, Green declared that the workers would make use of the strike if the owners resisted the operation of Section 7a, his threat was met with applause by the delegates. Thus Green had to maneuver to the utmost in putting through his anti-labor policy, not only before the working masses outside the convention hall, but inside at the convention itself.

Having made his bow to "the Left", *i.e.*, having threatened the owners with the strike (which Green is doing not for the first time, and it will not be for the first time when afterwards he will disorganize and crush the workers' strikes), he expounded his true attitude to the forthcoming struggle of the workers more freely: "We want to settle our differences [with the employers—I.M.] in the conference room". Passing on to the proposal of Roosevelt to convene a conference of owners and workers to fix the six-month's truce in industry, Green declared that he would be glad to accept such a proposal "any time it was made". In a special interview on the Roosevelt speech, Green declared that "it will meet with a warm reception from labor". All the other leaders of the Federation spoke in the same strain, especially the famous Gorman.

The new argument that the leaders of the Federation bring to the workers now is that the "old" N.R.A. was bad, but the "new", you see, is quite another thing. The reorganization of the N.R.A. was made under pressure and threats from the Right circles of finance capital. The bourgeoisie and the social-reformists emphasize this side of the affair: that after the reorganization any agreement between the workers and the owners will not be "compulsory". That is all very well. But the class-conscious workers must raise the question in another way: since the owners are so satisfied with this "non-compulsion", isn't it a bit suspicious? And so it is: it all amounts to this, that if, before, all kinds of N.R.A. committees sometimes tried—and only tried—to force the owners to put through the obligations taken upon themselves in the codes as regards the workers, now there will be no interference of this kind on the part of the State. This is what pleases the owners. The workers have nothing to be pleased about in this "non-compulsion".

Finally, it is obvious why the bosses of Wall Street are satisfied with the "new" N.R.A., are satisfied that Roosevelt makes *obeisances* to meetings of bankers instead of mild threats to the Right, that the National Industrial Association which raised thunder and lightning against the "old" N.R.A., has taken to "heartily supporting" Roosevelt's proposals for a six-months' truce, by "appealing" to the workers on their part to support it as well.

It was not the leaders of the A. F. of L. at their convention, but the Communist Party, which expressed the attitude of the working class of the U.S.A. towards the reorganized N.R.A. The *Daily Worker*, central organ of the C.P. of the U.S.A., in its issue of October 2, 1934, wrote:

> "In the period of a so-called truce, the Roosevelt government hopes to put over the employers' wishes and at the same time eliminate the resentment and resistance of the workers. . . . No, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Green, no, you exploiters of labor and your labor lieutenants, you will not get away with this trick.
>
> "There can be no truce between the profit-grabbing employers and their wage slaves. There can be only struggle for the rights of labor, for better living conditions, for building the trade unions, for recognition, and against the whole lying foul scheme of the Roosevelt government."

There is no reason to imagine that the bourgeoisie will be able to stop the revolutionary upsurge, although the political consciousness of the masses lags behind the struggle that the workers are waging against the policy of the bourgeoisie.

ON THE THIRTY-HOUR WEEK

> "By unanimous vote the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor today adopted a resolution for the six-hour day and five-day week as one of the cardinal planks in its recovery program."

Thus the New York *Times* of October 9 reports the decision on the 30-hour week.

This is no new decision of the A. F. of L. either. At its convention in 1932 a resolution of this kind was passed. And then Green threatened in just the same way to force the owners to do this if they did not agree to it voluntarily. Now, as then, the leaders of the A. F. of L. approach this demand not from the viewpoint of the workers' interests, but from that of restoring capitalist economy. Just as then, the leaders of the A. F. of L. do not make it clear as to whether they are in favor of the demand for the 30-hour working week with the maintenance of a full weekly wage, or whether the hourly wage will be maintained with the corresponding drop in the weekly wage. Just as then, the leaders of the A. F. of L. want to use this demand to draw the attention of the workers away from the struggle for unemployment insurance, which is what the interests of the workers demand. All this must be explained to the workers, they must have explained to them the whole aim of the struggle, and its tactics, in order thereby to show up the true position of the leaders of the A. F. of L. This, however, does not mean that the Communists can simply limit themselves to the formulation of their position—for the 30-hour working week without wage cuts.

Communists must clearly and unconditionally emphasize the question of wages, for the capitalists are at times not against introducing a shortened working week—though never throughout industry—even to less than 30 hours, but with a corresponding, or even greater, reduction in wages.

The A. F. of L. union in the steel industry, at its convention in the spring of this year, passed a resolution for the general strike in the steel industry, under pressure from the delegates and against the leadership of the union. Their demands included increased wages and the introduction of the 30-hour working week. However, nothing came of it, because the trade union leaders sabotaged the convention decision on the strike, and the rank and file was unable to smash this sabotage.

Here is another example, in the textile industry. Here, twice before the strike this year, the A. F. of L. union demanded the 30-hour working week, and threatened to call a general strike if the owners would not agree to it voluntarily. However, the threat remained a mere threat, just as the demand remained a demand, until the pressure of the masses resulted in the convention of the textile workers in the fall of 1934 deciding to compel the leadership to call a general strike in the beginning of September. We all remember the heroic struggle of the textile workers. The demands passed by the convention of the union including both increased wages and the introduction of the 30-hour working week. And the workers would have been able to achieve this if the union, instead of being led by people who finally agreed to call the strike because of the pressure of the masses but who had no faith in, or desire for, victory, had been led by people who were deeply interested in the victory of the workers, and were, moreover, capable of organizing it.

The two examples we have given prove, first of all, that there is a strong movement among the masses for the 30-hour working week, and that the workers, obviously, do not take the interests of the owners and the saving of capitalism as their starting point, but consider their own direct interests. The frenzied rationalization even before the crisis raised the question of cutting down the working week. The workers fought against capitalist rationalization by way of the working day, striving to shorten it.

During the period of crisis, the intensification of labor made a huge jump forward. Consequently the workers are feeling the unbearable burden of the long working week and the long working day even more keenly. Hence the movement for the 30-hour working week. It is obvious that not a single worker, moreover, is thinking about a reduction in wages, but rather the opposite. And the A. F. of L. leaders dare not plainly formulate the question in this way, although, of course, they will not hesitate to put forward such a direct proposal if the forces of the workers are not strong enough to force the owners to accept their demands.

Hence we conclude that in advocating unconditionally against a reduction in wages, the advanced workers should pay special attention to organizing the struggle for a united front of the workers against the defeat of the struggle. Further, the Communists should remind the workers of the words and deeds of the leaders of the A. F. of L. on this question and organize and lead the struggle of the masses for the 30-hour working week.

This is how the New York *Times* correspondent from San Francisco reports Green's statement on this question:

> "Labor will seek to persuade industry to grant the shorter work week; failing that, it will use its economic strength through strikes to win acceptance of the change. Concurrently it will also fight for Congressional approval of the Black-Connery thirty-hour bill which once passed the Senate.
>
> "Mr. Green's 'fighting' [quotation marks on this word in original—I.M.] speech was received with an outburst of applause, the delegates rising to cheer his declaration."

How should the Communists act in order that Green will not be able to limit the truly militant mood of the workers to merely listening to his "militant" speeches and the applause they bring forth? One of the most important things to do is to work inside the A. F. of L. unions, by creating a united front with the A. F. of L. unions for struggle on behalf of the 30-hour working week.

CONCERNING INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM

This question occupied a central position in the A. F. of L. even before the convention opened.

It was a question of the conflict in the building trade unions of the A. F. of L., in the so-called "building trades department". For a long time now there has been a struggle in the building industry between several of the craft unions who control the building trades department of the A. F. of L. and the "big three"—the carpenters', electricians' and bricklayers' unions. The leaders of the building trades department of the A. F. of L. did their utmost to resist the inclusion of these three unions into their organizations on the grounds that the latter would get all the power and the leaders of the small craft unions would be the losers.

On the eve of the A. F. of L. convention this question was again an acute one in connection with the refusal of the leaders of the building trades to allow into the building trades department convention the delegates from the three unions mentioned, representing 400,000 workers out of the 1,500,000 engaged in these branches. There was hardly any motive given for the refusal, because the real reason for it was the fear of the present leadership of the A. F. of L. building trades that they would lose power. More than that, the refusal was in contradiction to the decision of the E.C. of the A. F. of L. concerning the admission of the "big three" into the building section. Neither did Green's interference and that of the E.C. of the A. F. of L. help at all. Both sides were threatening with a split from the A. F. of L. These unions have always been the backbone of the A. F. of L. The conflict was referred to the convention. The convention decision on this question should indirectly have been an indication of its attitude towards the question of the structure of the A. F. of L. unions. The convention proposed to the building trades section that it should within the course of 45 days accept the three unions which had not been admitted to the convention. The convention rejected the proposal of the leaders of the section to pass the whole business on to the E.C., without adopting any definite decision. Apart from the fact that this decision is in iself a sign of the growing unrest inside the A. F. of L., it is also characteristic in the sense of the growing dissatisfaction with the narrow sectarian policy of the A. F. of L., and in the sense of its being a definite appraisal of the mood of the convention delegates.

Still more significant was the voting of the convention on the question of the jurisdiction of the union of the brewery workers. The question came up in connection with the proposal to confirm the decision of last year's convention of the A. F. of L., which actually amounted to the union of the brewery workers, which is close to the industrial type of trade union, having no right to take into their ranks workers from those specialties in their branches that have their own craft unions, as, for example, the teamsters, engineers, firemen. Thus the question of the structure of the A. F. of L. unions—of the industrial or the craft type of trade union—was raised in an acute and concrete form. True, the convention confirmed its decision of the previous year, but only by a vote of 15,558 as against 9,305, *i.e.*, more than one-third of the votes were cast in favor of the industrial type of trade unions, although this was connected with a possible restriction of the

rights of the already existing craft unions. Moreover, it was characteristic of the position of the Socialist Party on this question—and not only on that question alone—that one of the leading Socialist trade union leaders, Dubinsky, head of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, cast the 1,500 votes of his union in favor of craft unions.

The outcome of these two votes was sufficient indication of the mood of the delegates of the A. F. of L. convention to make the leaders consider what to do about the question of craft or industrial unionism, the question of which was to come up directly before the convention.

But it was not only a question of the outcome of the voting. The votes themselves were merely an expression of the deep changes that have taken place and are still taking place in the working class of the U.S.A. and in the unions of the A. F. of L. Without in any way endeavoring to give an exhaustive analysis of these more general and serious questions, we shall note just a few points.

During the period of the crisis, the working class of the U.S.A. has passed through and is still passing through big tests. Two policies are going through a severe test: the policy of the class struggle and the mobilization of the working class for the struggle, on the one hand, and the policy of class collaboration and reformist craft division of the working class, on the other. Obviously, this process is complicated and not so rapid; the process is uneven, but its importance can in no way be underestimated. Life itself drives ever bigger masses of the workers to put into practice the policy of class struggle, towards a break with the policy of class collaboration. Hoover and Green had been unable to pursue the policy of class peace. Roosevelt and Green had been unable to hold back the growth of the class struggle through the N.R.A. Moreover, the growth of the class struggle, with the advent of Roosevelt, with the declaration of the N.R.A., with the transition to the depression of a special kind, led to a stormy influx of workers into the existing workers' organizations, and primarily into the A. F. of L. unions, although other workers' organizations grew as well, including the Communist Party, the only Party of the working class of the U.S.A. The influence of the Communist Party became national; it now already acts as a serious political factor, as the bourgeoisie themselves admit, although its influence is far from being as yet deep enough to make the broad masses consciously follow the Communist Party and adopt its policy.

The influx of workers into the A. F. of L. unions far from contradicts the fact that they have become radicalized. The workers did not hesitate to show that in their mass strikes; and, moreover, the desire to fight was so great that even the A. F. of L. leaders were compelled to head these strikes, of course not to extend them, but to bring them to an end as soon as possible. The workers are joining the A. F. of L. unions not for the purpose of supporting Green's policy, but to defend their own interests. The old cadres of the A. F. of L. unions are becoming radicalized as well. The influx of new workers and the radicalization of the old members of the A. F. of L. have made an essential change in the A. F. of L. unions. They have become more like mass unions, more militant.

The membership of some of the unions of the A. F. of L., for instance of the miners, of the textile workers, grew by hundreds of thousands, they now claim to include 300,000 members and more each. Tens of thousands of new members have poured into the other unions. By the time of the convention, the total membership of the A. F. of L. was about 2,900,000; but the E.C. report claims that the actual number of members of the A. F. of L. is as much as 5,000,000, since there were tens of thousands of workers who were not registered yet as members at the time the report was drawn up. The E.C. considers that the A. F. of L. unions represent 12,000,000 workers engaged in enterprises where A. F. of L. unions exist. These figures are inflated and must be approached with caution; the fact remains, though, that without doubt the A. F. of L. unions show a mass growth, an influx of tens and hundreds of thousands of new workers.

Of course, the bulk of these workers are still not conscious of the political significance of their struggle; often their thoughts and actions are contradictory. But this mass has begun to move, and, through experience and mistakes, and with the help of its more advanced elements, it will seek for, it is finding, and it will find the road to the truly revolutionary class struggle. The Communists must find the correct approach to these working masses. And in order to do so, they must understand that their errors and mistakes are the errors and mistakes of the masses who have entered and are still entering the struggle against the bourgeoisie, that these errors and mistakes vanish in the process of the practical struggle, and will be lived down in that struggle, providing the vanguard of the working class establishes close connection with the aroused masses.

Under these circumstances, it is becoming more and more complicated and difficult for the leaders of the A. F. of L. to put through their capitalist policy, the policy of class collaboration. They must resort to complicated maneuvers, to make various kinds of concessions to the masses at different times. A viewpoint exists among the leaders of the A. F. of L. and among a section of the bourgeoisie that

it might perhaps be better to rid the A. F. of L. unions of these new "restless" elements and try to "strengthen" the A. F. of L. from the inside. This feeling broke through, even at the A. F. of L. convention, in a form that was obviously unpleasant for the leaders. For instance, Tobin, the leader of the teamsters' union, spoke in this strain, swearing like a trooper, shouting hysterically and saying that it was time the A. F. of L. was freed from the "rubbish" elements. Of course, this speech was greeted with indignation by the delegates, Tobin was shouted down, and the demand was made that he take back his words, etc.

Of course, these and similar differences of opinion do not create a crisis in the leadership of the A. F. of L. as yet, as certain comrades are inclined to think already. It is proof of the increasing difficulties felt in pursuing what has been the usual policy of the A. F. of L. leaders; it is proof of the growth of internal difficulties in the A. F. of L. This, however, does not signify a weakening of the A. F. of L. unions. On the contrary, this signifies that the bourgeoisie are finding it more difficult to pursue their policy through the A. F. of L. Thus, it is a weakening, though very insignificant as yet, of the position of the bourgeoisie in the A. F. of L. The unions of the A. F. of L. are called upon to defend the interests of the workers. But in actual fact, in so far as, and to the extent that, the old bureaucracy rules in them, they do not defend, but betray the workers' interests. Therefore, increased opposition work in the A. F. of L.; the launching of work by the Communists inside the A. F. of L. should now aim at strengthening and reinforcing the A. F. of L. unions as organs defending the daily interests of the workers.

The movement on behalf of industrial unionism is an expression of the radicalization of the A. F. of L. workers. There is no need to prove the advantages of the industrial unions over the craft unions in the struggle against the owners. Besides uniting the workers of a given enterprise and branch of industry into one trade union, the industrial union also removes the so-called jurisdictional conflicts between the craft unions, which take on an extremely ugly form in the U.S.A. (the case when one craft union smashes the strike or breaks up other actions of another craft union by means of actual strike-breaking). The craft unions are particularly favorable soil for all kinds of corruption and bureaucracy in the trade unions. And this is why the more conservative, the more rotten elements in the A. F. of L. cling so hard to the craft unions.

Of late an increase has been observed in the A. F. of L. unions in the so-called branches of mass industries like automobile, cement, aluminum, rubber, steel and others; moreover, unlike other unions, these branches are built up on the industrial basis in the form of the so-called "federal locals".

This type of trade union has its own long history in the A. F. of L. But what is important is that they spread on a mass scale in years when the working class movement is on the upgrade. This form of organization is distinguished by the way it unites all the workers of a given factory, regardless of their crafts, into one trade union, which is affiliated directly to the A. F. of L.

In those branches of industry already mentioned, these "federal unions" have grown to be a mass phenomenon during the last eighteen months. We have no exact figures, but according to an approximate estimate, from 500,000 to 800,000 workers are organized in these unions, *i.e.*, they constitute a powerful force.

The growth of these unions has brought the leadership of the A. F. of L. face to face with the question of the structure of the unions in an absolutely concrete form. The traditional line of the A. F. of L. leaders was that, after a short period of existence, the members of federal unions, as a general rule, were distributed among the craft unions. This time the leaders of the A. F. of L. were also not against following the same line. The leadership was compelled to change its tactics because of the general changes that have taken place among the masses, the growing urge to amalgamate the unions, and to create industrial unions, and because the mood of the membership of the A. F. of L. has been to struggle against the attempts to resist their desire to organize into industrial unions.

Of course, there was no lack of leaders who were willing to make use of the turn of events and to make political capital out of the movement. It was headed by Lewis, the leader of the miners' union, who advocated the industrial type of union. In his fight for power in the A. F. of L., Lewis, who represents the miners' industrial union, is grouping around himself representatives of other industrial and semi-industrial unions who are dissatisfied with the position they occupy in the A. F. of L., and the pressure of the leaders of the craft, often very small, unions. The Lewis forces had grown considerably at the last convention. The insufficient strength of the revolutionary opposition inside the A. F. of L., and their somewhat unclear position on the question of the industrial unions, at times (the implication of the arguments being that since Lewis is in favor of it, then there must be something wrong about it, and there is no reason to be too strongly in favor), hindered the opposition from heading this movement. And this, of course, left the leaders of the A. F. of L. with much freedom of action for their internal bartering and unprincipled compromises.

And this was the case at the convention. The question was discussed for six whole days behind closed doors, in a special resolutions commission under the chairmanship of the arch-reactionary, Matthew Woll (vice-president of the A. F. of L.). The commission finally came to a unanimous conclusion—to propose to the convention that it should allow the organization of industrial unions in three branches of industry—the automobile, the cement and the aluminum, and also carry on recruiting into the unions in the steel industry. This was followed by touching scenes of delight (even tears) on the part of some leaders, and the resolution of the commission was approved. The bourgeois press and that of the Socialist Party seized upon this decision as "historic", as "a turning point in the history of the American Federation of Labor", as "opening up a new epoch of the labor movement", etc. On the other hand it would be just as wrong to say that because of all this noise, it was all, apparently, a cunning trick which aims to strengthen craft unionism in the circumstances, and was not worthy of any further attention.

Both viewpoints are wrong.

Let us look a little more closely at the decision.

We have already spoken of the general importance of the question and will not repeat ourselves here. It is obvious from all that has been said that the leaders of the A. F. of L. entered into a rotten compromise. We can add further that Matthew Woll, in speaking on the subject of the resolution, gave the utmost assurances that it would change nothing and that it signified nothing, and that those in favor of craft unions had nothing to be alarmed about. This was all so convincing that Lewis was compelled to get up and declare that the resolution meant just exactly what was written in it. Those who spoke gave the utmost assurances that both the rights of the craft unions would remain unviolated, and that the federal locals would remain intact.

To culminate everything, control of the three newly formed unions (in the automobile, cement and aluminum industries) until they should, as it were, become of age, should remain directly in the hands of the E.C. of the A. F. of L. This compromise expressed itself in the fact that the Lewis group on the one hand, and Green on the other, came to an agreement to increase the E.C. of the A. F. of L. from 11 to 18 members, in order to include therein the representatives of the first group. The reason for this increase apparently was in principle that the tasks of the E.C. of the A. F. of L. were now greater. We do not doubt the latter, but we doubt whether this was the real reason for increasing the membership of the Executive.

It is quite obvious that the struggle is not yet ended, and that we are up against a halfway compromise. The decision on the question of the steel workers' union points to this as well. In this union of late, since the betrayal of the strike, the old leadership is apparently unable to deal with the membership. The old leadership barely pulled through the elections. And so the E.C. of the A. F. of L. has decided to take the business of the union directly into its own hands. Apparently this is an attempt to prevent the opposition elements from increasing their influence in the leadership of the union. Quite fairly the question can also be raised thus: if the American Federation of Labor could usurp the right of the old industrial union of the workers in the brewing industry in favor of the craft union, then what guarantee can there be given to the newly organized young industrial unions, that in similar circumstances they will not be dealt with likewise? And here we come up against a most important question.

It would be absolutely wrong to underestimate the whole problem of the industrial unions and in particular the decision of the A. F. of L. convention, because it appears to be based on a rotten compromise and because the bureaucrat Lewis is also in favor of the industrial type of union. This would actually mean adopting the position of the A. F. of L. leaders, *i.e.*, to lose sight of the masses, to lose sight of the principle and the practical side of the issue, because of the petty intrigues of the leaders.

It is stupid to seek for guarantees in any of the formulations given in the decisions of the A. F. of L. convention. The guarantee must be created by organizing the masses, by making them more class conscious. From this angle it would be shortsighted to fail to see behind the rotten compromises of the leaders of the Federation that they are making a concession before the pressure of the masses, a concession that is incomplete and scanty, a concession given not without hope of reducing it in one way or another to nil, but they are nevertheless concessions in the face of the pressure of the masses. And if this concession is so incomplete, it is just because the masses have not been sufficiently organized and solid. And the task of the advanced workers and Communists now is to raise the whole question at the right angle, to explain correctly the decision of the convention, and to lead the movement for industrial unions without any hesitation. Therein lies the only guarantee that the work will not stand still, and more so, will not go back to rotten compromise; therein lies the guarantee that the workers in the industrial unions will use all the advantages they have over the craft unions, and not, on the contrary, that the bureaucrats will make use of them against the workers. From the perfectly correct

position—that the form alone of the organization still does not decide the question, but that the important thing still is, who is leading, and what policy is being pursued—one must not draw the conclusion that the question of the form is therefore of no consequence. This would mean trying to make a policy by bare declarations alone, *i.e.,* voluntarily to hand over both the organization and the leadership to alien elements. The Communist Party must raise the question of the leadership of the movement for industrial unions by leaving upon the advanced workers and unmasking all unscrupulous hangers-on.

OTHER QUESTIONS AT THE CONVENTION

Let us deal briefly with the other questions.

First, concerning *unemployment insurance.* The convention brought in nothing new in this respect. The movement for unemployment insurance has become a general one in the U.S.A., although the bourgeoisie has still done nothing whatever to realize it practically in any form whatever. The question is still being "studied" and postponed. One draft gives way to the next, one promise replaces another. The only draft which corresponds to the interests of the workers is the proposal put forward by the Communist Party. Their proposal has already acquired wide popularity and has received the approval of hundreds and thousands of local trade unions and other workers' organizations. In particular, five international unions affiliated to the A. F. of L. have subscribed to this draft at their conventions. However, the A. F. of L. convention rejected without any discussion the draft for unemployment insurance and approved another draft for insurance, the so-called Wagner-Lewis Bill, which cannot satisfy the workers to any real extent.

By doing this, the A. F. of L. has shown that, despite all its idle talk about the needs of the unemployed, it does not intend to do anything serious to help them. This may serve as an indication of the intentions of the Roosevelt government on this question and the extent to which it is generous in verbal sympathy and promises towards the unemployed concerning the future legislation on unemployment insurance.

This means that the struggle and the mass campaign of the united front for unemployment relief and insurance must be increased. In particular, the members of the A. F. of L. unions have the right to raise the following question: what was done at the convention by those delegates who represented unions and organizations of the A. F. of L. which had approved the draft of the workers' unemployment insurance bill? Why did these delegates not defend the will of their members at the convention, and why did they not, even more, defend the decisions which their organizations have already accepted? Are decisions made, are conventions called, is the workers' money to be wasted, on sending delegates, on paying trade union officials' salaries, and all so that these decisions can be shelved and spat upon? Yes, this is a perfectly fair question, and it must be put straight to the delegates.

In just the same way, the convention rejected the resolution for the formation of a mass labor party without any discussion taking place, and continued its traditional A. F. of L. policy, *i.e.,* that of supporting one of the bourgeois parties, although the movement for a labor party has taken on a pretty extensive character in the A. F. of L. unions.

We must also deal with *international questions.* Of late the leadership of the A. F. of L. has been paying much attention to its international relations. Without doubt this is partly explained by the policy of American imperialism. The government of the U.S.A. has joined the International Labor Bureau of the League of Nations. Immediately after this, the question was raised in the A. F. of L. as well. A representative of the I.L.O. was present at the San Francisco convention, having arrived to negotiate about affiliating the A. F. of L. to the I.L.O. Citrine, the English reformist leader, was also present at the convention, as president of the Amsterdam International, and called upon the A. F. of L. to help the International in its fight against fascism. Green, who spoke in reply, assured Citrine that his appeal would meet with a "hearty welcome", and that the workers of the U.S.A. "are against all forms of dictatorship whether Communist or of the Hitler type".

But the policy of American imperialism can only partly explain the change of the A. F. of L. on the international question. A more profound and serious reason is without doubt that the growth of fascism and the danger of war are calling forth ever increasing alarm among the working masses of the U.S.A. The successes of the Communist Party in organizing the movement against fascism and war go to prove this. The working class of the U.S.A., are feeling more and more the need for international solidarity in the struggle against fascism and war.

It follows from this that the advanced workers must still more increase their international work, for there is now favorable soil among the masses for this work.

* * *

The A. F. of L. convention has shown, first and foremost, that inside the A. F. of L. as well as throughout the country, changes have taken place which cannot fail to reflect themselves in the policy of the A. F. of L. and in the behavior of its leaders. It would be utterly un-Marxist to raise the question thus: that the policy of the A. F. of L. was

capitalist and remains so, and that consequently nothing has changed. It would be more incorrect to characterize the decision of the A. F. of L. convention as a "fascist proposal", as a "fascist decision", directed towards "converting the A. F. of L. unions actually into company unions", etc.

Obviously, the policy of the A. F. of L. leaders has been and remains capitalist. It is hardly likely that many class-conscious workers can be found who would base their policy upon the hope that the leaders of the A. F. of L. will ever become proletarian revolutionaries. We are first and foremost interested in what changes have taken place in the A. F. of L. that are now forcing the leaders to undertake different maneuvers, to grant different concessions, while remaining the servants of the bourgeoisie, and even going into closer collaboration with them. We are interested in this from the viewpoint of the future practical possibilities of working, and the tasks connected with working, both inside and outside of the A. F. of L. A concrete example:

Before the A. F. of L. convention, its leaders, and first and foremost Green, launched a furious campaign against the Communists and the more militant, class-conscious elements in general to get them expelled from the A. F. of L.; they did this to keep on the right side of the bourgeoisie. Green sent a corresponding letter to the locals. At the convention, the A. F. of L. had intended to put through a decision on this question. But despite the reactionaries, the leaders of the A. F. of L., as a whole were compelled to slacken their anti-Communist campaign. They had to do so for the simple reason that, as the *New Leader* informs us, Green met with strong resistance from below.

The *Daily Worker* has been giving information from the locals concerning dozens of big and small organizations of the A. F. of L., which turned down Green's letter. In one of the locals, a worker proposed that Green should be answered in a manner which would "make his hair stand on end"; in another it was proposed that his letter be chucked in the waste-paper basket, etc. This in no way means that the struggle around this question is finished. On the contrary, it will increase. The changes taking place among the masses create an opportunity of doing extensive opposition work in the A. F. of L.

This was expressed—true, very weakly and in the presence of an organized opposition at the convention. We have no exact information as yet, but whereas in the past only one or two class-conscious delegates were elected to the annual convention, this time there were a dozen or more. The general mood of a considerable section of the delegates, as we showed, was more radical than in previous years.

The traditional policy of the A. F. of L. which has only once been violated during the war, was to deny the State the right to interfere in the relations between workers and owners. This, of course, did not in any way lessen the capitalist character of the policy of the A. F. of L. leaders. With the development of the crisis, the leaders of the A. F. of L. have begun to advocate open collaboration with the State. With the introduction of the N.R.A., this collaboration has become even more close. At the convention which has just come to a close, the leaders of the A. F. of L. have gone still further in this direction, by declaring that peace and collaboration in industry can be achieved by accepting the principle of the N.R.A., according to which the owners are organized into their own associations, and the workers in "their own independently controlled trade unions"; the State will act as arbitrator.

This position adopted by the leaders of the A. F. of L. represents a yearning towards closer and more open collaboration with the capitalist State. It can bring nothing but harm both to the A. F. of L. unions and to the workers as a whole. This must be explained to the rank-and-file members of the A. F. of L. But the work of explaining this is not simplified by the fact that the decisions of the A. F. of L. convention are labelled "fascist", directed towards converting the A. F. of L. unions into company unions, etc., etc. On the contrary, this will only complicate our task, for things are not so simple as that. The leaders of the A. F. of L. have been compelled by the pressure brought to bear upon them by the masses to make concessions and to maneuver on internal and on international questions. At the same time they are entering into closer collaboration with the State, and they are seeking there support for their anti-labor policy.

All this means that in perspective, the actual gulf between the policy of the leaders and the desires of the masses is growing. The leaders will do their utmost by maneuvering and by making concessions to come into line with the masses, at the same time increasing their struggle against the more advanced elements. This means that the most patient and convincing enlightening work must be carried on, that all opportunities of working in the A. F. of L. unions must be made use of. But we must not restrict ourselves to explaining and unmasking the leaders alone. We must show in actual practice that we are better fighters than the leaders of the A. F. of L. for the workers, that we are better trade union workers than the A. F. of L. officials.

The tasks of our trade union work are a problem to be dealt with separately.

THE LEADERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST PARTY ON THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

By C. REDMILL

I. THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS THE WAY

SEVENTEEN years of the existence of the Soviet Union have shown such great achievements in the improvement of the position of the Soviet workers, the complete liquidation of unemployment, and in the development of the productive forces of the country that even the enemies of the working class and of the Soviet Union are forced to admit them. Technique and the rich natural resources of the Workers' Republic are being harnessed by the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the service of the working class in a struggle against the backwardness and poverty of the past, left behind by capitalism, and in a struggle for a classless society that will know no oppression of man by man.

The socialist character of the October Revolution has become so well established that even bourgeois economists are forced to admit it. To start a discussion with the leaders of the Socialist Party on this question seems almost superfluous. Still, the continuous reappearance of their arguments against the Soviet Union and in view of the influence that these people still have on some sections of the workers, makes it necessary to answer them in order to expose the true character of their demagogy.

When these unprecedented achievements of the Soviet Union are contrasted to what is happening in the capitalist world at this time, the bankruptcy and decay of the capitalist system become all the more striking. Huge, closed-down factories, rusty from disuse, and the large armies of "superfluous" humanity —the starving unemployed—are a living accusation against capitalism. They are a sign that capitalism, itself, has become superfluous, and that not only is it unable to develop further the productive forces in society, but it is not even able to use those productive forces which it has already developed. The very productive forces that it created are now, like a Frankenstein, rising to destroy their creator.

The situation in the United States is the best example of the bankruptcy and decay of capitalism. Just consider the picture of despair given by Mr. Tugwell, a member of Roosevelt's "Brain Trust", in his book, *Our Economic Society and Its Problems*:

> "Years will pass before the full meaning of the depression starting in 1929 can be determined. But we already know that *if one-third of our population lived on the poverty level in* 1929, the number of urban and rural families on this level had risen in 1933 to approximately 15,000,000 families, or *over one-half of the entire population of the United States.* And of these 15,000,000 families, from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 were probably destitute." (My emphasis—C.R.)

Mr. Tugwell tells us that the poverty level in which over one-half of the American population lives is "the level of living which does not provide a minimum of health and decency. . . . The evils of urban poverty are low-grade, monotonous work, the strain of living without a surplus, physical impairment of men, women and children through overwork, undernourishment, and evil working and living conditions."

If this is a picture of the "poverty level" then one can imagine what the position must be of the 10,000,000 families living "in destitution" in the United States, the richest capitalist country whose "achievements" at one time were the envy of capitalists in the other countries.

Is it any wonder, therefore, that Mr. Tugwell is losing faith in the eternal character of capitalism when he admits the following?

> "For with equal levels of living, the greater economic democracy and equality of the Russian system will make a tremendous appeal to the masses of intelligent men. . . . And there are many who believe that capitalism in its nineteenth-century and present form would prove a weaker system than the system being developed by the Soviet Union."

Indeed, the Soviet Union is a living accusation against capitalism; it is proof that it has outlived its usefulness.

The Soviet Union has made Socialism a reality, has by this very fact not only disproved the argument of the apologists of capitalism "that Socialism is impossible", but has created a living symbol for which the working class must strive, in its struggle to overthrow capitalism.

The international significance of the Soviet Union lies in the fact that it has shown the path the working class in the capitalist countries must travel in order to establish Socialism in their own countries. The Soviet Union is a tremendous factor in helping the C.P. in the mobilization of the working class in its struggle to overthrow capitalism. Lenin, in his pamphlet *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder,* states:

> ". . . some fundamental features of our revolution are not local, not peculiarly national, not

> Russian only, but they are of international significance. . . . But at this historical moment such is the state of affairs that the Russian example reveals something quite essential to all countries in their near and inevitable future. The advanced workers in every land have long understood it—in many cases they have not so much understood it as felt it through their revolutionary class instinct."

The growing sympathy and support for the Soviet Union by the broad masses in the United States is an expression of the fact that these masses of workers are beginning to realize that the Soviet Union is showing the road for the way out from capitalist exploitation and oppression. The international significance of the Soviet Union is becoming clearer to the workers. This is reflected not only amongst the workers under the influence of the Communist Party but amongst large sections of unorganized workers and amongst the rank-and-file workers under the influence of the reformist trade union bureaucracy and of the Socialist Party. As a result we find a vicious campaign against the Soviet Union carried on not only by the bourgeoisie, but also by some of the leaders of the Socialist Party.

This campaign of the Socialist Party has as its purpose not only to discredit the proletarian revolution in the Soviet Union, but particularly to convince the workers in the United States that the October Revolution is not the path to be followed by them in their struggle against capitalist oppression. Or, as Norman Thomas put the question: "Our country cannot and must not be forced into Russian molds." (*The Choice Before Us*, p. 82.)

II. THE SOCIALIST CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

The slanderous arguments of the Socialist Party leaders, against the Soviet Union, can be summed up in the main in the following points: (1) The October Revolution was not a socialist revolution. (2) The Dictatorship of the Proletariat is not the form of the transition from capitalism to socialism. (3) There is no need for a violent overthrow of capitalism.

Basically the attitude of the leadership of the American Socialist Party to the October Revolution in the last years has not changed, it is only covering itself with different phrases, as can be seen from a comparison of the views of Hillquit and the "Old Guard", and those of Norman Thomas, the "militant" leader of today.

Some years ago, in the discussion "On the Road to Socialist Control", Hillquit wrote:

> "The economic regime of Soviet Russia is, if possible, even less socialistic than its political structure. . . . The Bolshevik revolution was in the nature of a historical accident. . . .
>
> "The Russian experiment is a complete vindication of the Marxian philosophy, negatively rather than positively. It has furnished concrete and conclusive proof that a Socialist order cannot be established in a country of backward industrial development. The most earnest efforts to create a Socialist state are doomed to failure in the absence of suitable economic conditions; the seed of socialism cannot grow to fruition on sterile soil."

Compare this with what Norman Thomas wrote in his *Ameria's Way Out*:

> "The very backwardness of Russia, economically speaking, its nearness to the soil and its low standard of material well-being enabled it to endure a degree of economic chaos that would reduce the highly organized industrial nations of Western Europe or the United States to a frenzy of madness or despair."

It is clear that basically there is no difference in the position of the "militant" Mr. Thomas and the "Old Guard". The only difference is in the way they present their arguments. On the one hand, the "Old Guard" argues from the position of international Social-Democracy, that the October Revolution is not and could not be a socialist one because of the low development of the productive forces and because it established the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Reverend Thomas, on the other hand, less trained in "Marxian" phrases, arrives at the same position through different arguments. For him a revolution is necessary only in a country where the productive forces are low, in an industrially backward country, with no experience in democracy. From this he draws the conclusion that the October Revolution is not a socialist revolution and has no international significance, especially for the American working class living in a highly industrialized country.

The Socialists attempt to justify this slander of the October Revolution through the "Marxist" teachings on the development of the productive forces. Thus they quote the following well-known sentence from Marx's introduction to the *Critique of Political Economy*:

> "No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society."

To oppose Marx to the Russian Revolution, to deny the socialist character of the October Revolution in the name of Marx, is a pure falsification of Marxism, taking from it its revolutionary essence and attempting to turn it into a dead dogma, into its very opposite.

Engels, in *Anti-Duhring*, written in 1878, in developing these ideas of Marx, pointed out that in

Germany of the 70's of the last century, the productive forces of capitalism had already outgrown capitalism. "The new productive forces have outgrown their bourgeois form of utilization." Does it need much to show that the productive forces in Russia in 1917 were, to say the least, equal to those of the 70's in Germany? The S.P. leaders today are simply repeating it in a new form.

In the epoch of imperialism it is not enough to say that the productive forces of this or that country are ripe for the revolution.

> "Nowadays we have to regard the proletarian revolution, first and foremost, as the outcome of the growth of antagonisms within the world-wide system of imperialism, as the outcome of an effort which (in this country or in that) breaks through the chains of worldwide imperialism." (Stalin.)

Lenin, in his analysis of the law of the unequal development of capitalism, already before the October Revolution, gave the theoretical basis for the understanding of the possibility of the successful prol tarian revolution in one or more countries—not necessarily the most highly developed. In the epoch of imperialism, as a result of the unequal development of capitalism, it is possible for the proletarian revolution to break through this unequal chain of imperialism in its weakest link, providing the working class has its revolutionary party that can organize the working class, and its allies, the farmers and the oppressed nations, to utilize the favorable situation when it arrives.

In perverting this ABC of revolutionary Marxism, the leaders of the Socialist Party are not original. These old arguments, in one form or another, were presented since the 90s of the 19th century. After the Russian Revolution they became one of the cornerstones of the anti-Soviet propaganda of the Second International. In answering these arguments, Lenin wrote in 1923:

> " 'Russia has not attained the degree of development of the productive forces which makes socialism possible.' All the heroes of the Second International, including, of course, Sukhanov, treat this proposition as holy writ. They repeat this indisputable proposition in a thousand ways and imagine that it is decisive for an estimate of our revolution. . . .
>
> "If a definite level of culture is necessary for the establishment of socialism (although no one can say what this definite 'level of culture' is), then why should it be impossible for us to begin first of all by attaining in a revolutionary way the prerequisites for this definite level, and *afterwards*, on the basis of the workers' and peasants' power and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other peoples?
>
> "You say that a state of civilization is required for the establishment of socialism. Very well. But why could we not first of all create such prerequisites for a state of civilization in our country as the banishment of the landlords and of the Russian capitalists and then start moving towards socialism? Wherein is it written that such variations in the usual historical order are inadmissible or impossible?
>
> "I recollect that Napoleon wrote: 'On s'engage et puis on voit.' Translated freely this means: 'We must first of all join in a serious fight and then we shall see.' "

Here we have clearly an answer to these gentlemen. The proletarian revolution, the establishing of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, made it possible not only to build "the prerequisites" for socialism but to proceed to "overtake the other people", and build socialism itself.

Russia, formerly an agricultural and backward country, has now become an industrial country.

> "During this period, the U.S.S.R. has become radically transformed; it has discarded the features of backwardness and medievalism. From an agrarian country it has become transformed into an industrial country. From a land of small individual agriculture it has become a land of collective, large-scale mechanized agriculture. From an ignorant, illiterate and uncultured country it has become—or rather it is becoming—a literate and cultured country covered with a network of higher, middle and elementary schools operating in the languages of the nationalities of the U.S. S.R." (Stalin.)

The following facts show the tremendous development of the productive forces:

PERCENT OF OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY TO GROSS OUTPUT OF THE WHOLE OF NATIONAL ECONOMY

(in prices of 1926-27)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
1. Industry	42.1	54.5	61.6	66.7	70.7	70.4
2. Agriculture	57.9	45.5	38.4	33.3	29.3	29.6
Total	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.

Where did history see such tremendous development of the productive forces? Only the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, the working class organized as the ruling class, made this possible.

The Socialists are forced to admit these facts. To deny them would be impossible. To speak now, when there are about 23,000,000 proletarians, of the low productive forces in Russia being an indication that there is no socialism here, is, to say the least, ridiculous, and does not carry much weight with the workers. Therefore, Mr. Thomas comes to the rescue. All this is true, says Mr. Thomas, Russia made tremendous strides forward, it built industry, etc., but this does not make it socialism. But here again

they leave out of consideration the basic question as to which class is in power, which class owns the means of production. They leave out of consideration the following facts:

> "It is a fact that the socialist system of economy in the sphere of industry now represents 99 per cent and in agriculture, calculating the sown area of grain crops, 84.5 per cent of the whole, whereas individual peasant economy represents only 15.5 per cent. . . . [the socialist system] now has unchallenged predominance and is the sole commanding force in the whole of national economy." (Stalin.)

Thus, Thomas starts the old argument all over again. Any arguments will do in order to try and show that in America we need no proletarian revolution. It is this fear of the proletarian revolution that makes the Socialist Party reject the class struggle. It makes the Socialist Party into supporters of the reactionary Gompersite leaders of the A. F. of L. It makes the Socialist Party a defender of capitalism, not only in keeping the workers from the coming revolution, but by often playing a strike-breaking role in the immediate struggles of the workers. It makes them fear the united front that is leading the workers to struggle against the offensive of capitalism. Thus we see that the "new" and "learned" Socialist arguments are not new and not learned and not socialist. They are the policy of keeping the workers from the path of the revolutionary class struggle that leads to the proletarian revolution, to "October".

III. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Having established, at least to their own satisfaction, that the October Revolution was not and could not be a socialist one, the leaders of the Socialist Party attempt to hide themselves behind demagogic attacks against the "despotism" of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and come out as defenders of "democracy". In a pamphlet prepared for the last S.P. convention, Abe Cahan writes: "The slums of the Russian cities and their voiceless terrorized inhabitants on the one hand, and the glorious municipal socialism of Vienna with its free speech and free voting it guaranteed on the other hand, is the difference between despotic Bolshevism and democratic socialism." The dead workers on the barricades of Vienna, the workers in the concentration camps in Austria, being murdered and tortured by the fascist terror, the road for which was laid by this very municipal and tenement-house socialism, are an accusation against the treachery of the Bauers in Austria and their doubles in the U.S.

The demagogic arguments of the "Left" Thomas are an important supplement to this open reactionary demagogy of the "Old Guard" in the Socialist Party. The preconvention discussion of the S.P. had as one of its central issues the problem of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Some Socialists even tried to give the impression that the term "workers' democracy" which they advocated was synonymous with the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Norman Thomas, however, in opposing this has revealed the wide gap which lies between their conception of "workers' democracy" and the proletarian dictatorship, that their conception of "workers' democracy" is nothing more or less than another form of bourgeois democracy.

To Norman Thomas bourgeois democracy is not the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but on the contrary, to him it implies a limitation of bourgeois power. He considers that under a bourgeois democracy, the fact that the capitalist class rules through political parties based upon an electoral system which includes the petty bourgeoisie, farmers and workers, is further proof of the "democratic" character of this rule. It is obvious that he approaches the question of democracy from a "legal" point of view and not from the class point of view, *i.e.*, from the point of view of which class is in power. Through this means he is able to classify the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the Soviet Union together with the anti-working class, fascist dictatorship of Italy and Germany.

In his book *The Choice Before Us,* he states:

> "Nowadays it is the fashion in some quarters under Communist and Fascist influence to decry democracy or what passes for democracy, as peculiarly a capitalist invention. *Historically that is not the case.* It is true that capitalism with its revolt against the static classification of men which prevailed under feudalism, did demand increased political power for the middle class. In the process it conceded increased political power to the workers." (My emphasis—C.R.)

Again he shows the "superiority" of "democracy" when he says:

> "This liberty of speech, the press, and assembly has lost ground not only in the war years but in the post war period. But the apologists for either Communism or Fascism who cite certain notable and shameful abridgements of liberty in America as proof of the utter hypocrisy and the complete similarity of conditions here and in Russia, Germany or Italy, talk nonsense."

Thomas utilizes the ever-growing hatred and bitterness of the broad masses of the American workers against the bloody rule of fascism in order to vilify the proletarian dictatorship. Mr. Thomas, in his historical estimation of democracy, fails completely to consider the basic class issues, the issue of which class controls and owns the means of production, which class is in power. The proletarian dictator-

ship, that is, the proletariat organized as the ruling class, owning and controlling all the means of production, carrying on the struggle for the abolition of all classes, this he compares with fascism, the most ruthless open dictatorship of the financial oligarchy.

The fear and aversion of the Socialist leaders to the proletarian revolution, and to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as the transition period from capitalism to socialism, leads them to reject the class struggle. In place of the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Social-Democracy elaborates the theory of the peaceful overgrowing from capitalism to socialism, through the development of industrial democracy and parliamentarism. Bourgeois democracy is presented as the first stepping stone to "socialism".

In the United States, as the result of its peculiar social and economic development, the illusions concerning bourgeois democracy are deep rooted among broad sections of the working class. This makes it especially important to expose the essence of such slanders as those of Mr. Thomas, making clear to the workers the real significance of the proletarian dictatorship as the only possible form of working class democracy. The present brutal terrorism on the part of the government, in its attempt to stem the rising tide of the revolutionary upsurge in the United States, is forcing the working class to struggle for the most elementary civil rights, is exposing the class character of bourgeois democracy. This, together with the growing prestige of the Soviet Union among the American workers, is helping to root the conception of the necessity for the proletarian revolution and the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the United States amongst broad sections of the working class. This is being expressed even within the ranks of the Socialist Party, where for the first time since the split in 1919, the issue of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is coming forward as a serious problem.

The resolution introduced by the so-called Revolutionary Policy Committee (whose purpose it is to keep the radicalized Socialist workers from going to Communism), which contained a clause in favor of the proletarian dictatorship, was defeated by a slender majority of 513 votes out of 16,715 recorded, showing how the idea of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is penetrating into the ranks of the Socialist Party.

IV. REVOLUTION BY "PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY MEANS"

"In its struggles for a new society, the Socialist Party seeks to attain its objective by peaceful and orderly means", declares the "militant" declaration of principles adopted at the convention. Advocating the conception of industrial democracy as a peaceful overgoing into socialism, the Socialist Party directs its main fire against the revolutionary class struggle that must culminate in the violent overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie. This is the same policy that is being advocated by International Social-Democracy. It is the policy that prepared the road for fascism in Germany and Austria and it is the policy that will disarm the workers in the U.S.

Because this theory has now become discredited even among Socialist workers, they introduce all kinds of arguments about their readiness, under certain conditions, "to crush by its labor solidarity the reckless forces of reaction". They also introduce the argument that in the event of a complete collapse of capitalism, the Socialist Party "will not hesitate" to establish its own government, etc. But these arguments, Thomas hastens to elaborate, do not conflict with the basic tenet of "socialism", to "attain its objective by peaceful and orderly means".

The Socialist Party justifies its opposition to the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie not only through pacifist phraseology but even by resorting to "Marxist" theory. Thus they try to prove that the Socialist Party with its theory of the peaceful growing over into socialism, was the real disciple of Marx.

> "When the *Communist Manifesto* was written, the modern regime was in its infancy. Universal suffrage and social legislation were things practically unknown and parliamentary government hardly existed outside England. From the socialist point of view there was little worth preserving in the prevailing social order and there was practically no method for the accomplishment of radical, political and economic changes except violent revolution. The belief in the ultimate necessity of a violent overthrow of the existing social order was therefore *an accepted tenet of the early Marxian creed*.
>
> ". . . With the rapid extension of popular government during the last fifty or sixty years this assumption gradually lost ground. *Marx was the first among the Marxians* to admit the possibility of a peaceful transition in countries of political democracy." (*Socialism of Our Times*, pp. 64-69, edited by Thomas and Laidler. My emphasis—C.R.)

Here the Socialists try to picture Marx in the period of the *Communist Manifesto* as being an ardent supporter of violent revolution in contradistinction to Marx in the latter period developing into a "peaceful" revolutionist. But what is actually the case? In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx places the question that in order to attain emancipation the working class must overthrow capitalism, must conquer political power, that is, the working class must organize itself as the ruling class.

Following the same fundamental conception in his later works, Marx, in his analysis of the Gotha Program and especially in drawing the lessons of the Paris Commune, emphasized and concretized these conceptions, clearly pointing out the character of the transition period as the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The greatest contribution of the Paris Commune, Marx pointed out, was that it "discovered" the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Marx to his last days remained a revolutionist. Only the leaders of the Socialist Party try to falsify history in order to justify their betrayal of revolutionary Marxism.

It is correct that Marx stated that in certain countries such as England and the United States, there was a possibility of a peaceful going over into socialism. It is essential, though, for a correct understanding of Marx to understand the specific character of those countries at the time in which Marx wrote. Marx wrote this in the days of industrial capitalism, in the 60's of the last century, when militarism and bureaucracy were weak. In elaborating this conception of Marx, Engels, in his preface to the first volume of *Capital*, pointed out that Marx "certainly never forgot to add that he hardly expected the English ruling classes to submit without a 'pro-slavery rebellion' to this peaceful and legal revolution". To mechanically transfer Marx's analysis which applied to a concrete historical period, to the period of industrial capitalism, to the epoch of imperialism when the United States and Great Britain became the outstanding imperialist powers with powerful armies and navies, is deliberately to distort Marx for the purpose of betraying the socialist revolution.

V. WHAT IS SOCIALISM?

The Socialist Party not only tries to destroy the revolutionary essense of Marx's teachings on the overthrow of capitalism and of the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, but falsifies the very conception of socialism itself. What is happening in the Soviet Union at this time, the Socialist leaders declare is not socialism. The question therefore arises: what is the Socialist Party's conception of socialism? Marx clearly pointed out that

> ". . . between capitalism and Communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the former into the later. To this also corresponds a political transition period in which the state can be no other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."

This is very clear and definite, but the Socialist Party leaders have confused the conception of the transition period in order to make it easier for them to mislead the workers.

The position of the Socialist Party leaders as to what they understand by "socialism" is clearly seen from their estimate of the Roosevelt program. In an official statement of the N.E.C. of the Socialist Party on the N.I.R.A., alongside with some mild criticism, it is stated that the "N.I.R.A. marks a new stage in the struggle of the workers against exploitation for profit". Norman Thomas also defends the N.I.R.A. "It is state capitalism, and no howls from the old enemies, Hearst and McCormick, Al Smith and Ogden Mills, who want to turn the clock back again, can make it anything else." He even goes further, speaking of the N.I.R.A. as the "break-up of the old order", picturing it as a step towards socialism. Even though, under the pressure of the rank and file, they were forced to withdraw some of their praise of the N.I.R.A., the fact remains that even today they consider the "old capitalism" dead.

What is this Roosevelt program that received such praise from the Socialist Party? It is a program strengthening the hold of finance capital upon the economy of the country through the closer welding of the State apparatus with the financial oligarchy. The Roosevelt program is an example of how the bourgeoisie, at the expense of the workers and farmers, manages to go over from the lowest point in the crisis to a "depression of a peculiar kind". It is an attempt by all kinds of "reforms", and by State "interference" to weaken the opposition of the workers to measures strengthening finance capital. The N.I.R.A. is a program of hunger and starvation for the masses, a program of fascization and war.

Lenin, in 1912, in an estimation of the significance of Theodore Roosevelt's election campaign, carried on under different circumstances, gave such a clear characterization of bourgeois reformism that it is today just as forceful as when it was written:

> "It is understood that in the presence of these contemporary slave-owners, all 'reforms' are an empty deceit. Roosevelt, it is known, is hired by the clever billionaires for the preaching of this deceit. 'State control' promised by him, will—with the preservation of capital by the capitalists—be turned into a means of struggle against strikes and for crushing them.
>
> "But the American proletariat awakened and is standing at its post. He meets the successes of Roosevelt with a good natured irony—You carried along four million people with your promise of reform, amiable charlatan Roosevelt? Very well! Tomorrow these four million will see that your promises are a bluff, and after all, these millions follow you *only* because they feel: We can no longer live in the old way." (*Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XVI, pp. 191-2.)

These words of Lenin sound almost prophetic today. The tremendous strike wave of the American workers has as one of its main aims the struggle

against Roosevelt's industrial codes, that were originally promises of reforms to help the "forgotten man". In the hands of Roosevelt "state interference", "state control" has turned into the bloodiest terror to crush strikes.

What is the basic conception of the leaders of the Socialist Party that made it possible for them to consider the N.I.R.A. as a step towards socialism? It is that the transition period and capitalism in its monopolist stage, are identical. The Socialists take certain features of imperialism such as the huge trustification, the replacement of free competition by monopoly, etc., and present them as non-capitalist, as the growing over to socialism. In their effort to hide the class character of present-day capitalism, they deny the class character of the State, giving it a super-class character. They identify State interference with socialism, irrespective of whether the given State is a socialist one or a capitalist one, irrespective of who owns and controls the means of production, of which class is the ruling class. This is the usual Social-Democratic theory of "organized" capitalism. It is the theory of the ability of capitalism to overcome its inner contradictions, to do away with competition and anarchy of production, as a result of which there appears a "different" capitalism that is no longer capitalism. This replaces what they call "the old individual capitalism". This, to them, is the transition period. Lenin, in *State and Revolution,* has already exposed this conception:

> "This fact must be emphasized because the bourgeois reformist view that monopoly capitalism or state monopoly capitalism, is *no longer* capitalism, but can already be termed 'State socialism', or something of that sort, is a very widespread error."

The position of the Socialist Party,—slandering the Soviet Union while greeting Roosevelt's N.I.R.A. —is characteristic of the socialists, as the savior of capitalism.

VI. THE SOCIALIST PARTY AGAINST THE DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Thomas, in his last book, after analyzing the international situation, says: "The moral of the situation is that there is nothing in the position of Russia today in relation to the rest of the world which makes war inevitable". Just compare this to what Tugwell says in the above quoted book: "There is the equally real possibility of a series of trade wars or military wars between two world systems of equal power that are fundamentally incompatible. Just as it was impossible for our Union to exist half slave and half free, so it may become impossible for the world to exist half socialistic and half capitalistic."

Thus the "Socialist" Thomas is far behind Roosevelt's advisor, who sees that the Soviet Union is challenging capitalism and is therefore in danger of intervention. The reason Mr. Thomas does not want to see the basic contradiction in the modern world—the struggle between two antagonistic systems, between capitalism and socialism, is that Thomas, despite all *phrases* to the contrary, is a defender of bourgeois democracy, *i.e.,* the rule of the bourgeoisie. The reformist Mr. Thomas defends capitalism against socialism. This is the role of social-fascism, the savior of capitalism, from the proletarian revolution.

The American workers are waking up, they are rising against capitalism. At first they say: "We cannot go on living in the old way!" The more the "New Deal" exposes its true character, the more bitter becomes the class struggle in the U.S., the firmer stands the problem of a "revolutionary way out", *i.e.,* the way of October. The workers are beginning to realize the need for a united front in the struggle against "the old way of living". It is only through this united front struggle of the working class that the workers can stop the onslaught of capitalism, can successfully struggle for power, for the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, that will establish real workers' democracy, and that will attain real socialization of industry. History has doomed capitalism and neither the "old Guard", the "Militants" nor any of the other "Left" demagogues can save capitalism.

The revolutionary upsurge in America shows that the workers are going forward to the path that led the proletarian revolution in Russia to a victorious October.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE ECONOMY FOR WAR

By O. TANIN *and* E. JOGAN

THE most outstanding demand advanced by General Hayasi, the representative of the Japanese military clique, when the new cabinet of Okada was being formed, was the demand for the "preparation of plans for general mobilization of the country, taking into consideration the special conditions and character of modern warfare".

The necessity for putting forward this task arises from the direction taken by the present policy of the ruling classes in Japan. The preparation for new military annexationist adventures is the most decisive factor in all the organizations of Japanese imperialism, be it in the field of ideology, administration, economics or foreign policy. They are already beginning to realize the stupendous scale of the economic strain which a big war would place upon Japan.

In a document entitled "Materials on General State Mobilization", published in July, 1932, in the journal *Nihon Keidzai Nempo,* the authors come to the following conclusion:

> "A modern war demands the concentration of a tremendous amount of people, money and ammunition in the shortest possible time. In view of this, a plan for general state mobilization, providing for the fulfillment of these three important elements for the waging of war, must be drawn up on a big scale."

The present state of Japanese economy, however, is a long way from being able to provide for war needs. As Nosaki justly wrote:

> "If diplomacy shows its helplessness in face of the crisis of 1935-36 and if Japan proves to be in such a situation that it will have no choice but to liquidate the crisis [*i.e.*, to wage war—T. and J.], how will this affect the development of our country? The thing which we fear most of all is the 'danger invisible to the eye', which may arise owing to the insufficiency of economic preparations. We can find plenty of examples of this in world history."*

MILITARY AND STATE-MONOPOLIST CAPITALISM

The regulation of economy according to war needs, the forced development of the military branches of economy, the administration of economy such as would provide for its maximum military efficiency, appear to the Japanese military clique and to the leading groups of finance capital to be necessary prerequisites for the solution of the tasks dictated by the forthcoming war. The solution must take on the form of a military-state monopolist capitalism.

Professor Takso Mori, in his "Lectures on Wartime Economics", describes the concrete measures for the realization of the demands which will be presented to economy by war:

> "From the moment of the declaration of war, we may expect the introduction of state capitalism. . . . The state will have to interfere in industry and in the distribution of all the most important products for consumption. If necessary, the government may declare a monopoly on a series of scarce articles. Some of the factories will become the property of the government. Other factories will remain at the disposal of private persons, but will work under the control of the government, which will take upon itself the duty to supply the raw materials and to grant subsidies to them."

During the war, agriculture and trade will, of course, be under the control of the State. To float internal loans, the government will be forced to use various measures of compulsion, etc.

The fact that even before the war the ruling classes of Japan are taking steps to solve the task of an all-embracing military regulation of economy gives a no small advantage to that country. This can be seen when compared with German imperialism on the eve of the World War of 1914-18, which only in the course of the war itself understood the tremendous tasks which modern warfare presents to the entire economic system of a warring country.

There is no doubt that in comparison with many other countries that participated in the World War of 1914-18, imperialist Japan has some other advantages and other possibilities for the military regulation of economy. Two characteristic points should be particularly emphasized in this connection: Firstly, the role of the State in economic control as developed in Japan historically to be greater than in other countries; secondly, the high degree of the concentration of capital that has led to the formation of powerful monopolies which, in the words of a certain Japanese author, "are even in peace times a ready-made apparatus for the regulation of economy".

FORMS OF STATE CONTROL

Firstly, it is worthwhile to list here a number of the outstanding facts that show that the State appa-

* Nosaki, "Economic Preparedness of Japan". Journal *Dai yamondo*. Feb. 1, 1934.

ratus, which is the highest form of organization of the Japanese bourgeoisie and landlords and which forms the crowning point of their monarchy, plays a considerable role in the economy of the country. In the State-owned factories in the manufacturing industry, in mining and in transport, there are 550,000 workers, *i.e.*, 20 per cent of the total number of workers listed statistically for the whole of these branches of economy. The capital invested in the government-owned factories in these branches of economy amounts to 30 per cent of the total capital in these branches. As a rule, the State-owned factories are among the most highly concentrated. In the financial sphere, the government owns such powerful levers for regulating the money market as the eight State banks, which hold in their hands 20 per cent of the paid-up capital and 14 per cent of the total bank deposits of Japan. The deposit fund of the ministry of finance is two and a half billion yen. A considerable part of this fund consists of deposits in the postal savings accounts, which, as we know, are widely used for financing various State enterprises and for covering State loans. The law on the "prevention of the leakage of capital abroad" and the regulation of the discount rate gave to the government new levers for influencing the money market.

The government is a big shareholder and the actual dictator with a decisive vote in almost all the big Japanese companies working in the colonies. Those companies which are the main means of carrying on Japanese foreign aggression—on the South Manchurian Railway, in the Manchurian "mixed" companies, the Eastern Colonization Company in Korea, the Chosen Bank, the Bank of Formosa, the oil and the mining companies of Sakhalin, the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Eastern Asiatic Industrial Company ("Toa Kogio Kaisia"), the Industrial Export Company ("Kaigai Kogio"), the Japanese steamship companies in China, etc. Each of these financial firms and industrial companies has its subordinate firms—either of the industrial types such as the "Siowa" metallurgical plants and the Fushun coal mines of the South Manchurian Railway, or commercial companies and amalgamations, such as the Association of Exporters to China ("Nikka Dzittsugio"), financed by the Yokohama Specie Bank. It is unnecessary to mention that the leading role of the government in these colonial companies makes it possible to utilize them to the maximum degree for war purposes, as is shown by the role of the South Manchurian Railway in the construction of a war base.

Important forms of the government control are also the laws concerning the exporters' associations, the associations having the power to enforce the "control over the chief branches of industry", the State regulation of prices of silk, rice, etc. In 1925 and in 1931 the new laws were passed on the so-called "industrial artels", which have the right to make such decisions that, with the consent of the government administration, are binding also on non-members of these organizations. This law is now being applied in 62 branches of industry and applies to almost all the medium-sized industry of Japan, with the exception of thread making and distilling. There were 344 industrial artels at the end of 1933.*

The law on control over the chief branches of industry, which was adopted in 1933 at the 59th Session of Parliament, applies to 22 industries. Its chief point is the one giving the government power to take an active part in the actual process of the formation of a monopoly. The government can, according to the new law, change or annul agreements between manufacturers on the question of production or marketing, and can force individual industrialists who do nor submit to the agreement to sign it in full or in part.

In a number of cases, the government has compelled private manufacturers to unite into an association or has made the decisions of these associations compulsory for the non-members of the association. Examples of such semi-compulsory organizations are the 630 various productive associations of handicraft and commercial alliances ("Dogio Kumiai") with half a million members, the chambers of industry and commerce, the imperial agricultural society, the silk spinning, fishing, and lumber associations, etc. These organizations, formally independent public bodies, in reality give the government an opportunity to influence the direction of the respective branches of industry. The government policies of regulating the price of silk, rice, fertilizers, iron, steel, the fixing of an import quota for various goods (coal, rice, etc.) are also connected with the activity of such associations. In all these cases the agents of the government are also granted the right to make an expert examination of the products. This system as a whole will undoubtedly play a big role in time of war when the government is forced to limit strictly the production and consumption of some products.

THE APPARATUS FOR STATE CONTROL

All the factories receiving government subsidies are actually under financial control and sometimes also under technical control of the government. This applies particularly to ship-building, metallurgy, automobile and airplane construction. These subsidies are given in extremely varied forms. The government subsidies are issued either on the basis of a special law "for the encouragement of the railway, steamship lines, private railways, etc." (*e.g.*, at the 56th

* H. Iris, "Control of Small and Medium Industry" (article in the journal *Saikai Seisako Dziho*, May, 1934).

session of Parliament, subsidies were given to private enterprises, on the basis of this law, to the extent of 51,200,000 yen) or they are issued in the nature of exemption from income tax and some other forms of taxation (as, for example, a number of metallurgical enterprises, the exporters' associations, enterprises in the colonies). These subsidies at times consist of the government taking on itself the "rehabilitation" of semi-bankrupt enterprises, as was the case with the Formosa bank, the Kawasaki and Fudzinagata shipyards and with the Toyo Seitetsu steel company. When the government is particularly interested in the development of any enterprise, it even adopts the practice of giving them profitable orders, which is in the nature of a free gift (as was the case with the Eastern Nitrate Fertilizer Company). The government forms syndicates of State and private banks for financing these enterprises, a form which has been used on a particularly wide scale during recent years.

Beginning with the financial panic of 1927 and especially following the crisis of 1929, and the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the tendency has been for the government apparatus more and more to take on itself the initiative of carrying through the process of merging private enterprises and the accelerating of this process. Special government organs have been formed dealing with these problems, such as the "Premier Extraordinary Economic Conference" which works on the problem of uniting enterprises and standardizing their products, and such is also the "Bureau of Economic Rationalization" which works out measures for the extension of monopolies.

During the last few years the government is playing an ever more noticeable role in the utilization of the organizations of the village kulaks and the landlords. We have in view the agricultural cooperative associations.* At the present time there are in Japan 14,400 agricultural productive associations with 5,118,000 members. These associations supply their members with the necessary manufactured goods (mainly artificial fertilizers), organize the manufacture and sale of agricultural products and extend credits to their members. At the present time, 20 per cent of all the mineral fertilizers used in the villages are supplied through these associations.

These organizations receive loans at a low rate of interest from the government. Despite the limited extent of the aid given them by the governmnt, strong protests against it have arisen from the private commercial associations. But the government continues to support these village associations. One of the important reasons for doing so is that through them it is possible, more effectively than through any other agency, to regulate the development of agriculture in war time.

* Senseku Kotaro: "The Present-Day Situation of Agriculture and a Review of the Cooperative Movement in the Villages," *Keidzai*, April, 1934.

ROLE OF CAPITALIST MONOPOLIES IN WAR PREPARATION

The second important prerequisite and channel for the military regulation of economy in Japan consists of capitalist monopolies, with which the State apparatus is becoming more and more closely fused. Masaki, in his book, *War Economy*, gives the following figures on the investment of the big capitalist firms in the war industries:

Companies	*Investments*
Mitsubisi	244,000
Mitsui	243,230
Sumitomo	61,240
Okura	27,073
Furukawa	51,500
Sibuzawa, Asano and Ogawa	111,020
Nippon Sangio (Kukhara)	78,230
Dziugo Ginko (15th Bank)	90,590
Taiwan Bank	52,750

Such a large investment of capital in war industries made it possible for the largest concerns to become monopolists in the production of a series of commodities which are of great importance from a military point of view.

The last few years were years of crisis and economic strain, called forth by the necessity for paying enormous military expenditures and by the need of preparing the material basis for the arming of the army and navy. During this period there took place in the organizational structure of Japanese economy changes which still further strengthened the monopolist character of Japanese finance capital.

In the industrial sphere these changes consisted, mainly, of the more intensive fusion of similar enterprises. The narrowing of the market drove the capitalists strongly along this path, because otherwise it would have been impossible to reduce the cost of production and to adapt themselves to the low prices of commodities. This tendency was expressed in the conversion of cartels into syndicates, and later into trusts, by the direct merging of enterprises. Typical examples of this are the amalgamation of the three biggest cotton plants (Fudzi-Seisi, Odezi-Seisi and Karafuto-Seisi), the amalgamation of five big electric power enterprises, two steamship companies (Nihon-Yusen and Osaka-Siosen), two big artificial silk factories, and, finally, the amalgamation of eight of the biggest metallurgical plants. Such a process is new for Japanese finance capital, for which, before the crisis, the characteristic feature was vertical amalgamation, while, in the horizontal direction, matters never went further than cartelization, *i.e.*, agreements as to the volume of output, prices, markets, etc.

In the banking sphere, the years of the crisis were characterized by a further growth in the relative im-

portance of the biggest banks and the increasing tendency to form banking consortiums. Both of these processes took place on the basis of the intensive fusion of banking and industrial capital. The latter circumstance was assisted by inflation, because the devaluation of money increased the tendency to exchange money for commodities and to replace banking capital by securities.

The crisis not only did not in the least smooth down the struggle for the quotas between the capitalist monopolies and inside of these monopolies for the individual factories, but, on the contrary, intensified it. Moreover, the crisis led to the financial monopolists seizing still new positions in the various branches of industry, commerce, and transport. And since the financial monopolies, at the same time, continued to fuse with the State apparatus, this created the prerequisites for increasing the controlling role of the State.

It is extremely interesting, for example, to note the measures taken by the Mitsubisi Company, which show how capitalist monopolies are becoming the centers for the economic preparations of the country for war.

The House of Mitsubisi has enterprises which are receiving orders from the naval ministry at the present time—the docks and the gun plant at Nagasaki, etc. In addition to this, the House of Mitsubisi has factories receiving orders from the war ministry—the tank plant near Tokyo, the airplane works at Nagoya, the electro-technical plant in Kobe, etc.

The company apparatus united all these factories into a single trust under the title "The Trust of Heavy Industry". It set up there a mobilization department, one of whose tasks is to organize around its big factories a whole series of small factories preparing details, parts and half-manufactured products to be assembled and completed in the big plants.

In this way the Mitsubisi concern ensures for itself a very important role in the future ministry of military supply, alongside of the Mitsui concern, which has recently been developing the chemical industry in its factories at Miaka and which has a monopoly in the production of heavy long-range artillery in its plant at Muroran. The Kukhara company ensures the carrying out of that part of the mobilization of industry plan which affects copper, rolling stock, magnetos, etc.

Such are the two conditions (the role, greater than in any other country, of the government in economic control, and the high degree of concentration of capital), which, as we mentioned above, favor the introduction of the beginning of control and the regulation of economy in war time.

THE WEAKNESS OF JAPANESE ECONOMY

However, it would be incorrect to imagine that, already today, Japanese economy is ready to satisfy the demands that will be presented to it by war. Even if we leave aside the poverty of Japan in raw materials, its unfavorable balance of payment and the technical backwardness of a number of extremely important branches of Japanese economy (especially of machine construction), it should be noted that the very organizational structure of Japanese economy is characterized by a number of features which greatly weaken its ability for mobilization. The chief of them are:

a. The extremely scattered and small scale character of Japanese agriculture.

b. The lagging of the concentration of industrial production behind the centralization of capital, and, in this connection, the important role played by the small and medium-sized factories in industrial production.

BACKWARDNESS OF JAPANESE AGRICULTURE

Even in ordinary times, the food balance of Japan is unfavorable. But the situation is not so tense as to cause any insuperable difficulties for the country. In war time, though, the country will find itself faced with not only an increased demand for food products, but also by an inevitable reduction of the sowing area, which will sharply reduce the food balance of the country. This fall in the productive capacity of agriculture under war conditions inevitably arises from the low material and technical level of the development of agriculture in Japan and from the decisive role of hand labor in it. This is, in turn, a result of the relations existing in Japanese agriculture which create extremely unfavorable conditions for the increased use of machines in agriculture. The middle peasant is unable to buy these machines, while the kulaks, who can use the extremely cheap labor power of the landless poor peasants, find it unprofitable to utilize machines on tiny strips of land. According to the figures given by Kawanisi, in 1931 there was one machine in Japan for each 60 peasant homesteads.* But these were mostly machines of less than five horsepower, used mainly in the manufacture of agricultural products or in the irrigation system for pumping water, and were owned by kulaks. Machines were practically not used for the cultivation of land. Hulling mills existed, according to the same author, also to the extent of one for each 60 farms; machines for cleaning rice and barley existed one per 120 farms; water-pumps existed one per 50 farms; and threshing machines, one per 100 farms. Insofar as the ownership of cattle by the peasant farms is concerned, we find that out of the 5,500,000 peasant farms in Japan, 4,400,000 have no cows and 4,500,000 have no horses.

These figures are sufficient to show that agriculture in Japan is based on the hand labor of the

* *Kaizo*, October, 1932, page 47.

peasants. In time of war, however, the most able-bodied part of the male population will be taken away from agriculture, which will greatly reduce the labor balance on the peasant farms. A large proportion of the 1,500,000 horses owned by Japan will be used for military purposes. To this should be added the inevitable reduction in the supply of fertilizers, both nitrates and superphosphates, to the villages, the manufacture of these substances being switched over to the needs of war chemistry. Thus the heightened demand for agricultural products will be faced with a reduction in the productive capacity of agriculture.

The government has no means in its hands which could change this situation, as long as the characteristic peculiarities of the Japanese agrarian system remain in force. The scattered, subdivided and enslaved peasant landholdings are very difficult to bring under mobilization control. The dependence of Japan on the import of agricultural products will greatly increase in time of war.

THE PREDOMINANT ROLE OF SMALL SCALE PRODUCTION

We pass on to the question of the structure of Japanese industry. As its chaarcteristic feature, we have pointed out the lagging of the concentration of industrial production behind the centralization of capital, and, in connection with this, the important role played by small and medium factories in industrial production.

Government statistics do not give a full picture of this phenomenon because they only include factories with more than five workers. But, for example, according to the calculation of the Institute of Social Investigation, published in 1926, there were in Japan 5,278,000 industrial workers, while the government statistics gave the number of workers in factory industries as only 1,979,000. Thus, 3,200,000 persons, or 60 per cent of all the people occupied in industry, worked in enterprises having less than five workers.

The comparatively low level of concentration of production, even in the machine building industry, is shown, for example, by the fact that the total value of the annual output of this industry was as follows in 1930:

Enterprises	*Value in Yen*
Large scale (over 500 workers)	372,489,294
Medium sized (100 to 500 workers)	137,824,640
Small (5 to 100 workers)	184,411,197

Thus, almost half the output of this branch of production comes from small and medium factories.

The government statistics for 1930 on the most important products of factory industry, which include 179 branches of industry (in factories having not less than 5 workers) give a general picture for the concentration of production in Japan. If we take from these statistics the figures for two branches which particularly interest us and group them in a proper way, we obtain the following picture:

Branches of Production	Total	Total	Small Factories		Medium Factories		Large Factories	
	Factories	No. Wrkrs.	No. Facs.	No. Wrkrs.	No. Facs.	No. Wrkrs.	No. Facs.	No. Wrkrs.
Metallurgy	4,004	97,504	3,903	58,074	88	22,260	13	17,170
Machince Building	5,604	205,308	5,394	79,962	162	33,988	48	86,158

Thus, even in these two industries in which the degree of concentration of production is much higher than in all other branches of Japanese industry (with the exception of cotton spinning) the small factories play a very big role. The insufficient concentration of production in iron and steel production, which plays a decisive role in the economic preparations for war, are sharply felt by the government and the army. It hinders them in carrying out rationalization measures in these branches, makes production more expensive, hinders the fulfillment of productive tasks and makes Japan dependent on the importation of foreign iron and steel. This explains the measures which are now being hurriedly carried out to unite the private metallurgical factories around the State factories "Yavata".

In the machine building industry, as can be seen from the table, although concentration is greater than in metallurgy, nevertheless a large proportion of the workers are engaged in small factories, and the degree of concentration of industry is absolutely insufficient, with the exception of shipbuilding, with its 23 large and medium sized yards, the engine and railway car construction with 9 large and medium sized plants and the electrical machine building industry with 20 large and medium-sized plants. This causes organizational and technical difficulties when distributing and fulfilling military orders. This is shown by the fact that in the production of an airplane, in addition to the factory which directly receives the order and prepares the various details, another 450-460 small plants take part in the work, each of these in turn being served by three or four small enterprises. According to some, this system is one of the basic causes of the poor quality of the Japanese aviation motors and the high proportion of accidents in their air fleet. The low degree of concentration and the technical backwardness of the machine building industry create additional difficulties not only in the mastery of such new industries for Japan as airplane and tank construction, but even in the manufacture of artillery. Examples of this are the long delays in the preparations of the 75mm. field guns which are included in the plan

for the reorganization of the army, and the unsatisfactory character of those samples delivered to the army.

PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION OF INDUSTRY

The Japanese military clique are dreaming of building an ordered system of war economy on this scattered, backward and anarchist productive basis. This system they call now "State capitalism", now "State socialism", depending on the needs of the moment.

The series of laws on "the mobilization of industry for war", passed in 1918 when the military cabinet of General Teruchi was in power, was intended to prepare for the transition of the national economy to a war basis. In 1927, under the cabinet of ministers, a Bureau of National Resources was formed that became the highest inter-departmental organ for the preparation for general State mobilization.

In addition, a "Department of Military Preparations" and a similar department under the Naval Ministry, for purposes of mobilization, and maintaining contact with the Bureau of National Resources, were formed. Special officials in all the prefectures directly subordinate to the Bureau of National Resources, and charged with functions of mobilization in the economic sphere have been established. General control over the preparations for mobilization of economy is also carried out by the commanders of the divisions stationed in the permanent divisional districts.

A government order was published in January, 1934, according to which the war ministry attaches its inspectors not only to all the civilian establishments regularly manufacturing military supplies, but also to all those enterprises manufacturing articles needed by the army. The events in Manchuria were in general an impulse for the concretization of all the plans for economic mobilization. In November, 1931, *i.e.*, immediately after the occupation of Manchuria, a conference was held on the initiative of the Bureau of National Resources, to consider the working of a plan of general State mobilization on the basis of the material prepared by the Bureau. It was decided to hold a series of test mobilizations, and to hold the sessions of the commission for State mobilization in the districts where the test mobilizations were to take place. These meetings of the State commission for mobilization took place in Fukukuoka in Kiusiu (a district of heavy industry), in Osaka (also an industrial district) and in other places.

Test mobilizations of industry were held after this in a number of districts.

In the spring of 1934, in the district of Kansai, it was decided to test the factories which work for war needs, and to verify the inventory of the materials for the supply of war industry. This was done in connection with the scandal which had been unearthed in the supply of war materials and in the delivery of poor quality war supplies, chiefly automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles and accessories. A great number of worthless specimens were found among these articles. In the checking up of the materials being made, special attention was paid to the materials for the aviation industry, and also to leather, canvas, belts, etc.

At the same time, the check-up was aimed at making and perfecting the plans for the production of war materials by private concerns in case of a war. Considerable time had already elapsed since these plans were drawn up, and during this period there had taken place a change in the character and in the capacity of the factories, which in turn required a change in the war production plans.

In addition to this, from May 1 to August 1, this year, there was a test mobilization of selected industries throughout Japan which took the following form: (a) Factories received orders from the war ministry, calculated to occupy the full capacity of the factory for one month, which they had to fulfill parallel to their ordinary work, thus showing the actual possibility of increasing their output; (b) The employers placed women on work that did not require high skill, so as to discover how quickly they could replace men if the latter were mobilized; (c) Factories organized the utilization of river and horse transport in order to discover what part of automobile transport could be taken away for the use of the army without harm to industry; (d) Finally, the factories were tested from the point of view of their readiness for anti-aircraft and chemical defense.

STATE CAPITALISM AS SOURCE OF PROFIT

The carrying out of these measures shows that the plan for general State mobilization in Japan is already so detailed that it includes the concrete distribution of orders for separate factories and also, naturally, the supply of raw materials for these factories. Nevertheless, it is illusory to hope, as do the Japanese military-fascist cliques, that it is possible to centralize under military control all economic processes and in this way to ensure the fulfilling of the plan of the gigantic needs of a big war. No matter how fully so-called "State capitalism" is introduced, it cannot change the social structure of Japan and destroy the anarchy of production, competition, and the struggle between the various ruling groups and an unproductive expenditure of values by the ruling classes, etc. An illegal market will exist alongside the State distribution of commodities. Speculative prices will exist alongside government prices. There will take place a spontaneous redistribution of social labor in the various branches of

production, and a sharp struggle will commence between the competing groups of the bourgeoisie. The market will continue to dictate its own laws, distorted by war conditions.

There is no need to guess about the morrow in Japan, nor is it necessary to draw analogies from the history of the government regulation of economy during the World War in other countries, in order to confirm this. It is sufficient to observe what is to be seen at the present time in Japan.

Since the time when, under the influence of the crisis, the idea of "planned economy" became popular in Japan, and since this idea began to be exploited by the financial circles as a good pretext for getting State subsidies, and by the military clique as a convenient form of stimulating preparations for the mobilization of the country, every day brings new proofs that a single economic plan cannot be reconciled with the anarchy inherent in the structure of capitalist society.

Japanese imperialism's efforts at "planning" found a full expression in the idea of a "Japanese-Manchurian economic bloc". The struggle which developed around the carrying out of this project showed the sharpest contradictions between the various groups of the ruling classes in Japan. The attempts of the military clique to direct Japanese capital investments in Manchuria only along lines needed by its own purposes and to form a single center of control over all the branches of Manchurian economy have ended in failure.

Boku Tachibana, the well known Japanese journalist, characterizes the situation, which has arisen as the result of these attempts, as "conditions of extraordinary chaos and confusion".* At present the staff of the Kwangtung army is again advancing the proposal to form a State planning department of Manchukuo for the regulation of Manchurian economy. *Osaka Asakhi,* the newspaper of the Japanese bourgeoisie, has already published gloomy forecast that this plan will lead "to greater pressure being exerted on the South Manchurian Railway in the name of Manchukuo, even worse than when the former militarist clique was in power" and that the "struggle of Manchukuo and the S.M.R. is a development of the discord between the Kwangtugn army and thee S.M.R."**

The supporters of this plan were upset by this statement of *Osaka Asakhi* and reacted to it with a loud outcry:

> "If it is stated that the Japanese Ambassador, who is the highest Japanese organ in Manchuria, and his civilian and officer suite, together with the officials of Manchu Kuo of Japanese nationality, are one bloc, and the S.M.R. is another, and are opposed to each other, and that the struggle between them is still stronger than at the time of the Chang Sui Liang government, it is permissible to say that there is something wrong with the heads of the Japanese people who are not astonished at this."*

INCREASED COMPETITION AMONG THE CAPITALISTS

However, there is nothing here to get astonished about. The three-year history of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria is the history of a sharp struggle between the various groups of the ruling classes of Japan for a bigger share in the division of the Manchurian spoils and for a smaller share in bearing the burdens of payment for the Manchurian adventure.**

We cannot doubt that under the conditions created by a big war, the task of a still more widespread State control of the entire Japanese national economy will arise. The group struggle between the various strata of the ruling classes—the military, the bureaucracy, the landlords, competing firms, etc.—will become still stronger. "Extraordinary chaos and confusion" will arise on a still larger scale than is the case at the present time in Manchuria. As an example of this, we may take the struggle around the amalgamation of the steel plants connected with the measures of a military preparatory character now being carried out by the Japanese government. The question of the valuation of the various factories, and the forms of management of the united factories after amalgamation, called forth a keen struggle, scandalous exposes and accusations of bribery in the press. It led to a number of factories not joining the amalgamation. In reality it is impossible to begin to apply the law on the regulation of the discount rate one and a half years after passing, owing to the organized resistance of a number of financial groups. This has led to no small leakage of gold abroad.

The method of fulfillment of war orders by many factories is another characteristic phenomenon, as one newspaper reports:

> "The metallurgical and machine construction factories are now working day and night at full capacity. While on the one hand, they are satis-

* B. Tachibana, "The Meaning of the State Planning Department", *Mansiu Hioron,* No. 36, 1934.

** *Osaka Asakhi,* Feb. 11, 1934.

* Baki, "The Plan for the Formation of a Planning Department in Manchu Kuo", *Mansiu Hioron,* No. 16, 1934.

** As we know, the Japanese government has now decided to organize a Japanese administrative apparatus in Manchuria, giving the military clique complete control over all the economic life of the region. This decision caused the most heated protests to be made by a number of private manufacturers, and led, for example, to the collective resignation of 10,000 employees of the S.M.R. Co.

fied to have all this work, on the other hand, they are suffering from semi-compulsory war orders for special goods (strictly secret products). Simultaneously with the reception of a series of profitable orders these factories, one after the other, receive the above mentioned special orders. Owing to this, they are often obliged to refuse profitable orders or they are forced to a great extent to drag out the time of delivery of these other orders." *

On these grounds there have been a number of conflicts between the inspectors of the war office and the private factories carrying out military orders. But still sharper contradictions arise between the groups of the bourgeoisie, who are deprived of the possibility of receiving war profits, and those who are getting rich on war deliveries.

Under the conditions of war, the struggle around war profits will become extremely sharp. The strata of small industrialists, who are of great importance in Japan, will combine this with a struggle against the privileged position of the big firms regarding their supply of raw material, the receiving of subsidies, credits, etc. The influence of the spontaneous forces of the open market will express itself in the difficulty of regulating scattered factories and in the direct resistance on the part of the petty-bourgeois strata to the pressure of the State and of the financial apparatus.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that the influence of the spontaneous forces of the open market as a counterpose to the principle of the State regulation of war-time economy in Japan will make itself felt to a greater extent than did, for example, the external market in Germany during the World War. We make this statement considering that Germany during the World War carried on an economy that was to a great extent, if not entirely, isolated; its contacts with the external market became extremely weak, and this created favorable conditions for the regulation of economy within national limits. In an anti-Soviet war, Japan, we must suppose, will maintain (though on a smaller scale) considerable commercial contacts with the outer world.

It would therefore be incorrect to state that under war conditions, the law of value as an economic regulator will die away and that its place will be taken entirely by the planned calculation of natural needs—of metal, fuel, machines, food, labor power, etc. State regulation will constantly invade the sphere of market relations and the "free play of economic forces". It will come into sharp conflict with the laws of the market, limit their action, but will not be able to destroy them. The satisfying of the military needs of the country will become dominating. This will result in a sharp conflict with the entire private capitalist system, above which and on the basis of which will dominate the military system of the organization of economy.

* *Nihon Kogio*. March 11, 1934.

"STATE CAPITALISM" AND THE SHARPENING CLASS STRUGGLE

But it is still more important not to lose sight of another side of the question. We have in view the class nature of "State capitalism", especially in its Japanese edition, in view of the basic class contradictions in that country (*i.e.*, the State is weighted down with numerous feudal relics, by the fusion of finance capital with the military-bureaucratic State, by the colonial level of existence of the toilers and the oppressive form of exploitation). Lenin wrote about the state capitalism of America and Germany, at the time of the World War, that "their regulation consists of the fact that they bring the workers to a starvation level and that secretly (in a reactionary bureaucratic manner) ensure the capitalists profits higher than those that existed before the war". * We have every reason to apply the Leninist analysis to Japan. The authors of the project for the military organization of economy are already stating that "the cartels and syndicates of modern industry are a peace-time orgnization which is fully ready to direct industry during the war",** *i.e.*, they openly put their stake on the commanding role of Japanese monopolist capital. This means that the military organization of economy, based on and aiming at the preservation of "class peace" in the country, in reality creates the objective conditions for the sharpening of class contradictions and the deepening of the class struggle in the country. These phenomena will be strengthened by the tremendous pressure of war expenses on the income of the country in view of the fact that this income is so small.

On the eve of the World War, the per capita income in the money units of 1913 in the following countries was as follows:

France	960 francs
Britain	50 pounds
Germany	625 marks
U.S.A.	350 dollars

In Japan, in 1934, on the eve of a big war, the income per head is 50.4 gold yen, *i.e.*, about 7 per cent of the corresponding amount in the U.S.A.

From this rises the danger of revolutionary upheavals, the breaking of class peace, the maintenance of which is a prerequisite for carrying out the tasks of providing for the war.

An English bourgeois journal, which is by no

* Lenin, *The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It.*

** Prof. Mori, "Lectures on the Economics of War Time".

means prone to give an exaggerated estimate of the revolutionary prospects, wrote recently in its correspondence from Japan:

> "In the tense atmosphere of the war danger, the combined action of the financial crisis and agrarian calamities and the extremely low level of life form a stern test for the proverbial 'loyalty of the Japanese to their national ideals'. A danger may arise for the very semi-feudal system on which modern Japan rests. Although 'dangerous thoughts' are violently crushed, they are by no means dead and can become an important factor in the national crisis." (Translated—*Ed.*)

However, the warning voice of wisdom in the camp of the ruling classes of the country and the voice of protest of the toiling masses are drowned and suppressed by the military clique which has a monopoly on "patriotism". The French paper *Le Temps* was therefore right when it wrote at the beginning of this year:

> "The difficulties of a financial and of a social character against which Japan is fighting may make the Tokyo government disposed to wait and try to gain time. But to wait means to give up, and the outlook for a tragic crisis in the Far East continues to exist in full force."

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SEN KATAYAM

IN MEMORIAM OF A GREAT REVOLUTIONIST

NOVEMBER 5 marked a year since the death of Sen Katayama, the founder of the Communist Party of Japan, whose leader he remained until he died. Sen Katayama was one of the outstanding figures in the Communist International.

Sen Katayama gave more than fifty years of his life to the working class, to the proletarian revolution. He was the first organizer of the working class movement in Japan and led the first struggles there of the young working class movement. Katayama was the first agitator of Marxism in Japan and in the Far East. At the start of the working class movement in Japan, he propagated Marxism in his paper. This paper played an important historical role. It is no accident that, twenty years later, during the days of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, Katayama translated Lenin's *State and Revolution* into Japanese and distributed it among the Japanese workers.

However, Sen Katayama does not belong only to the Japanese proletariat. He was a model of proletarian internationalism. It was Sen Katayama—the first among the revolutionaries of Asia—who built the bridge between the working class movement of Europe and Asia. He was one of the few outstanding leading figures of the pre-war Second International, who was not sunk in the swamp of opportunism, but found his way to the Communist International.

Sen Katayama entered the arena of the international working class movement during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. During that year, at the Amsterdam Congress, he shook hands with Plekhanov —the representative of the Russian Social-Democracy. This handshake became historical and it has remained forever the symbol of proletarian internationalism.

Sen Katayama never abandoned the position of proletarian internationalism. His staunch revolutionary spirit withstood the test of 1914. While Plekhanov, from the very first day of the imperialist war, betrayed proletarian internationalism, going over to the camp of the chauvinists, Katayama, although forced to be away from Japan, remained, through all the years of the war, a faithful and tireless fighter for the world proletarian revolution.

In the fall of 1931, when the Japanese imperialists began their predatory war in Manchuria, Katayama did not waver or hesitate. From the very start he adopted the Leninist position of revolutionary struggle against imperialist war. He tirelessly taught the Japanese Communist Party how to fight against this Japanese imperialist war and how to bring their imperialist "fatherland" to defeat. He taught the Japanese how to mobilize the masses for the defense of the U.S.S.R., for the independence and integrity of China and how to struggle for a Soviet Japan. The fact that the Japanese Communist Party from the very first day of this war adopted the correct Bolshevik position and answered the war of Japanese imperialism with heroic anti-war work among the masses, is the result, in no small degree, of the tireless work of Sen Katayama.

Until the very end of his days, Sen Katayama remained a fighter for the proletarian revolution, an example of proletarian internationalism. He could with full right declare from the tribune of the anti-war Congress held in 1932 that:

> "I can assert with joy that I have kept my promise made here in Amsterdam twenty years ago. I promised to fight for international proletarian solidarity, and until this very day have I, together with the Japanese Communist Party and revolutionary workers, fought for it and against Japanese imperialism. Today, I again pledge myself to fight against Japanese imperialism and in the first place in the defense of the Soviet Union—the fatherland of the world proletariat. I, from this tribune of the Congress, appeal to the proletariat of the entire world to act in the same way."

* * *

The Commission for rendering eternal the memory of Comrade Sen Katayama appeals to all comrades having any letters or materials of the deceased, also material referring to his activities, to please turn them in to the archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (Marx and Engels Street, No. 5, Moscow), where material is being collected and prepared for the publication of the literary heritage of Sen Katayama.

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